Web and Internet Economics

Mechanism Design and Pricing.- Two-way Greedy: Algorithms for Imperfect Rationality.- Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials.- The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing.- On Symmetries in Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design.- Welfare-Preserving $nvarepsilon$-BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Loss.- Strategyproof Facility Location in Perturbation Stable Instances.- Contract Design for A orestation Programs.- Relaxing the independence assumption in sequential posted pricing, prophet inequality, and random bipartite matching.- Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness.- On the benefits of being constrained when receiving signals.- Towards a Characterization of Worst Case Equilibria in the Discriminatory Price Auction.- Matching, Markets and Equilibria.- Improved Analysis of RANKING for Online Vertex-Weighted Bipartite Matching in the Random Order Model.- Beyond Pigouvian Taxes: A Worst Case Analysis.- The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home.- Mechanisms for Trading Durable Goods.- Formal Barriers to Simple Algorithms for the Matroid Secretary Problem.- Threshold Tests as Quality Signals: Optimal Strategies, Equilibria, and Price of Anarchy.- The Platform Design Problem.- A Consumer-Theoretic Characterization of Fisher Market Equilibria.- Learning, Fairness, Privacy and Behavioral Models A tight negative example for MMS fair allocations.- Approximating Nash Social Welfare Under Binary XOS and Binary Subadditive Valuations.- Default Ambiguity: Finding the Best Solution to the Clearing Problem.- Planning on an Empty Stomach: On Agents with Projection Bias.- Eliciting Social Knowledge for Creditworthiness Assessment.- Social Choice and Cryptocurrencies.- Decentralized Asset Custody Scheme with Security against Rational Adversary.- The Distortion of Distributed Metric Social Choice.- Maximal Information Propagation via Lotteries.- Envy-free division ofmulti-layered cakes.- Computing envy-freeable allocations with limited subsidies.