Vagueness

This book develops a new theory of vagueness, based on the idea that vagueness is a global rather than a local phenomenon. This leads to a new semantics for vagueness and a new logic. Kit fine then applies this theory to traditional philosophical puzzles including the sorites paradox, the problem of personal identity and to the transparency of mental phenomenon.

---

Vagueness is a subject of long-standing interest in the philosophy of language, metaphysics, and philosophical logic. Numerous accounts of vagueness have been proposed in the literature but there has been no general consensus on which, if any, should be be accepted. Kit Fine here presents a new theory of vagueness based on the radical hypothesis that vagueness is a "global" rather than a "local" phenomenon. In other words, according to Fine, the vagueness of an object or expression cannot properly be considered except in its relation to other objects or other expressions. He then applies the theory to a variety of topics in logic, metaphysics and epistemology, including the sorites paradox, the problem of personal identity, and the transparency of mental phenomenon.

This is the inaugural volume in the Rutgers Lectures in Philosophy series, presenting lectures from the most important contemporary thinkers in the discipline.