Disputed Decisions of World War II

Mark Thompson was a full-time professor at Harvard University from 1975 to 1983 and has been a visiting professor at the Université de Paris and the Universität Bielefeld in North Rhine-Westphalia in Germany. He taught courses on decision science, game theory, and social program evaluation. He lives in Lexington, Massachusetts.

Table of Contents


Acknowledgments

Introduction

1. Dieppe

The Strategic Decision: Should Dieppe in August 1942 Have Been Raided? 5 • The Outcome: Minor Success; Profitless Movement; Major Disaster 13 • Later Decisions: Should Reserves Have Been Sent to Red and White Beaches—As Was Done? 15 • The Outcome: Wounding, Capture and Death 16 • Still Later Decision: Should the Operation Have Been Called Off—As It Was? 16 • The Outcome: The Return of Twelve Hundred; Crowing in Berlin 17 • How Bad Was the Outcome? How Significant the Battle? 17 • An Alternative Approach to Judging Decisions and Outcomes, That of Decision Science 18 • Did the Lessons of Dieppe Make Its Outcome, on Net, Good? 19 • What Pluses, Other Than Its Lessons, Did Operation Jubilee Have? 21 • Judging Decisions Apart from Outcomes 22 • Was Undertaking Jubilee a Good or a Bad Decision? 23 • How Much Did Ill Luck, Flawed Execution, or Poor Intelligence Contribute to the Bad Outcome? 25 • Given the Retrospective Consensus That the Plans for Operations Rutter and Jubilee Were Disastrous, Why Had They Been Approved? 28 • Could No One Have Prevented the Suicidal Folly? Did the Fault Lie in the ­Meta-Decisions—The Determinations of How the Decisions Would Be Made? 31 • ­Meta-Decisional Issues: How Should ­Go-No-Go Determinations Be Made? How Were They Made on Dieppe? 34 • Did the British Authorize Rutter/Jubilee Expecting Failure—Perhaps Also Hoping for It and Even Acting to Sabotage the Raid? 35 • The Expected Value of Information 37 • What Should the Allies Have Done? 38 • Models of Governmental ­Decision-Making 38 • Conclusions 39

2. North Africa

The ­Grand-Strategic Decision: Should the Allies in November 1942 Have Landed in North Africa? 41 • The Four Steps of Decision Science 49 • Competing ­Grand-Strategic Priorities 49 • Strategic Alternatives 51 • Tactical Choices 52 • 

Uncertainties 54 • Values: ­Anglo-American Differences in Outlook and Priority 57 • 

Modes of Decision Influence 59 • Roosevelt and Marshall 65 • The Outcome: Brief Opposition in Landing; Loss of the Race for Tunis; Capturing Thrice as Many Men as Had Been in the Afrika Korps 66 • The Sequence of Outcome Ratings for Torch: First Good; Then Bad; Ultimately, Better Than Good 72 • The Planning Fallacy 73 • Consequences of the Allied Failure to Take Tunis Quickly 75 • Was Undertaking Operation Gymnast/Torch a Good or a Bad Decision? 75 • Was the Decision of Adolf Hitler to Send More Troops to Africa Good or Bad? 78 • Game Theory 80 • ­Other-Side Perception 81 • ­Move-Order Plusses and Minuses 83 • Conclusions 84

3. Messina

The ­Non-Decision: Should the Allies in July and August of 1943 Have Acted, More Than They Negligibly Did, to Prevent the Escape of 53,000 Germans Across the Strait of Messina? 87 • The Outcome: Allied Conquest of Sicily; German Escape; Italian Forsaking of the Axis Alliance 88 • How Good or Bad Was the Outcome of Operation Husky? 89 • Judgments on the ­Non-Decision of Failing to Interdict German Flight and Its Outcome 90 • What Affected How Bad or How Good the Outcome of Operation Husky Was? 91 • What Steps Might the Allies Have Taken to Have Captured or Killed Tens of Thousands More Germans in Sicily? 93 • Why Did the Allies in Sicily Not Take Any of Many Possible Decision Alternatives, Instead of Drifting into Their Actual, Inferior ­Non-Decision? 97 • Who, If Anyone, Was at Fault? 99 • What Should the Allies Not Have Done? 100 • Principals and Agents; Unity of Command 102 • Why Did the Germans in Sicily Do Better Than the Allies? 108 • The Perspective of Game Theory 108 • Risk Aversion 109 • Organizational Behavior 109 • How Bad Were the Consequences of the ­Non-Decision at Messina? 110 • Conclusions 111

4. Anzio

The Strategic Decision: Should the Allies in January 1944 Have Landed at Anzio? 113 • The Operational Decision: Should Major General John Lucas, in His First Two Days Ashore, Have Pushed Boldly Forward—Which He Did Not Do? 118 • The Outcome: Stalemate at the Beachhead 120 • Did the Operational Decision of John Lucas Have a Good or a Bad Outcome? 122 • Was the Operational Decision of John Lucas Good or Bad? 123 • Did Operation Shingle Have a Good or a Bad Outcome? 125 • Deciding on Shingle 127 • Uncertainties 128 • Values 130 • Judgments of the Decision to Undertake Shingle 131 • Shingle as a Bluff 132 • ­Game-Theoretic Perspectives on Anzio 134 • Governmental Politics 134 • Conclusions 137

Epilogue: The Science of Deciding, the Theory of Games and War

The Planning Fallacy 139 • Ways of Influencing and Resolving Decisions 139 • Public Opinion 143 • Weariness 145 • Age 148 • Decision Fatigue, Food and Sex 152 • Groupthink 153 • Expertise 157 • Numbers 159 • Principals, Agents, Asymmetric Information, Command Unity and Coalitions 162 • The Potential Value of Decision Science and Game Theory Between Dieppe and Anzio 165 • Better Decisions in Conflicts to Come 167

Chapter Notes

Bibliography

Index