Game Theory in Economics

Edited by Ariel Rubinstein, Professor of Economics, Tel Aviv University, Israel

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

PART I: Non-Cooperative Game Theory: Basic Concepts

J. F. Nash (1950), ‘Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games’
J. F. Nash (1951), ‘Non-cooperative Games’
H. W. Kuhn (1953), ‘Extensive Games and the Problem of Information’
J. C. Harsanyi (1967), ‘Games with Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian Players’
J. C. Harsanyi (1973), ‘Games with Randomly Disturbed Payoffs: A New Rationale for Mixed-strategy Equilibrium Points’
R. J. Aumann (1974), ‘Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies’
R. J. Aumann (1976), ‘Agreeing to Disagree’

PART II: Refinements of Nash Equilibrium

R. Selten (1975), ‘Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games’
D. Kreps and R. Wilson (1982), ‘Sequential Equilibria’
E. Kohlberg and J. F. Mertens (1986), ‘On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria’
I. K. Cho and D. Kreps (1987), ‘Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria’

PAT III: FINITE HORIZON GAMES

R. Selten (1978), ‘The Chain Store Paradox’
R. Rosenthal (1981), ‘Games of Perfect Information, Predatory Pricing and the Chain-store Paradox’
D. Kreps, P. Milgrom, J. Roberts and R. Wilson (1982), ‘Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma’

PART IV: INFINITELY REPEATED GAMES

D. Blackwell (1956), ‘An Analog of the Minimax Theorem for Vector Payoffs’
A. Rubinstein (1979), ‘Equilibrium in Supergames with the Overtaking Criterion’
D. ABREU (1988), ‘On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting’
D. Fudenberg and E. Maskin (1986), ‘The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information’

PART V: Modeling Bounded Rationality

R. Radner (1980), ‘Collusive Behavior in Noncooperative Epsilon-Equilibria in Oligopolies with Long but Finite Lives’
A. Rubinstein (1986), ‘Finite Automata Play the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma’

PART VI: Bargaining

J. F. Nash (1950), ‘The Bargaining Problem’
J. F/ Nash (1953), ‘Two-person Cooperative Games’
A. Rubinstein (1982), ‘Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model’

PART VII: Auction

W. Vickrey (1962), ‘Auction and Bidding Games’
P. Milgrom and R. Weber (1982), ‘A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding’
R. Myerson (1981), ‘Optimal Auction Design’

part viii: Implementation

A. Gibbard (1973), ‘Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result’
R. Myerson (1979), ‘Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem’
E. Maskin (1985), ‘The Theory of Implementation in Nash Equilibrium’

PART IX: Cooperative Game Theory

L. S. Shapley (1967), ‘on Balanced Sets and Cores’
L. S. Shapley and M. Shubik (1969), ‘On Market Games’
M. Shubik (1959), ‘Edgeworth Market Games’
G. Debreu and H. E. Scarf (1963), ‘A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy’
R. J. Aumann (1964), ‘Markets with a Continuum of Trades’
L. S. Shapley (1953), ‘A Value for n-Person Games’
L. S. Shapley (1969), ‘Utility Comparison and the Theory of Games’