Israel's Long War with Hezbollah
Georgetown University Press (Verlag)
978-1-62616-611-0 (ISBN)
Israel’s Long War with Hezbollah is both the first complete military history of this decades-long conflict and an analysis of military innovation and adaptation. The book is based on unique fieldwork in Israel and Lebanon, extensive research into Hebrew and Arabic primary sources, and dozens of interviews Marcus conducted with Israeli defense officials, high-ranking military officers of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), United Nations personnel, a Hezbollah official, and Western diplomats. As an expert on organizational learning, Marcus analyzes ongoing processes of strategic and operational innovation and adaptation by both the IDF and Hezbollah throughout the long guerrilla conflict. His conclusions illuminate the dynamics of the ongoing conflict and illustrate the complexity of military adaptation under fire.
With Hezbollah playing an ongoing role in the civil war in Syria and the simmering hostilities on the Israel-Lebanon border, students, scholars, diplomats, and military practitioners with an interest in Middle Eastern security issues, Israeli military history, and military innovation and adaptation can ill afford to neglect this book.
Raphael D. Marcus is a nonresident fellow at the Insurgency Research Group in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, where he received his PhD. His research interests include Middle East security issues, terrorism, military affairs, and organizational learning. He is currently working as an intelligence and counterterrorism analyst at a law-enforcement agency.
Table of ContentsContentsAcknowledgmentsList of AbbreviationsIntroduction
Part I: Strategic AdaptationIntroduction to Part IChapter 1: IDF "Routine Security" and the Evolution of Hezbollah (1985-92)Chapter 2: Deterrence, Guerrilla Warfare, and the Establishment of the "Rules of the Game" (1993-99)Chapter 3: A Change in the Strategic Equation: The IDF Withdrawal from Lebanon (2000)Chapter 4: The Erosion of Deterrence, the 2006 War, and the Dahiya Doctrine (2000-17)Conclusion to Part I
Part II: Operational AdaptationIntroduction to Part IIChapter 5: The Origins of the RMA in IsraelChapter 6: The RMA in Action: IDF Operations in Lebanon and Hezbollah's Adaptation in the 1990sChapter 7: The Rise of the IDF's Operational Theory Research Institute and Systemic Operational Design Chapter 8: The 2006 Lebanon War: Military Adaptation and CounteradaptationChapter 9: The Blame Game: A Reappraisal of the IDF's 2006 Operational ConceptConclusion to Part II
ConclusionsAfterword: Back to the Future: IDF Force Planning and Hezbollah's Military Adaptation in Syria ChronologySelected BibliographyIndexAbout the Author
Erscheinungsdatum | 10.11.2018 |
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Zusatzinfo | 1 Maps |
Verlagsort | Washington, DC |
Sprache | englisch |
Maße | 152 x 229 mm |
Gewicht | 503 g |
Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Geschichte ► Regional- / Ländergeschichte |
Geschichte ► Teilgebiete der Geschichte ► Militärgeschichte | |
Mathematik / Informatik ► Informatik ► Office Programme | |
Informatik ► Software Entwicklung ► Spieleprogrammierung | |
Sozialwissenschaften ► Politik / Verwaltung ► Europäische / Internationale Politik | |
Sozialwissenschaften ► Soziologie ► Spezielle Soziologien | |
ISBN-10 | 1-62616-611-0 / 1626166110 |
ISBN-13 | 978-1-62616-611-0 / 9781626166110 |
Zustand | Neuware |
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