The Worlds of Possibility
Modal Realism and the Semantics of Modal Logic
Seiten
2001
Oxford University Press (Verlag)
978-0-19-924655-7 (ISBN)
Oxford University Press (Verlag)
978-0-19-924655-7 (ISBN)
A critical exposition of modal realism, the philosophical doctrine that there exists many possible worlds of which the actual world is just one. It argues for modality without worlds and offers an account of the role of interpretations or structures of the formal languages of logic.
Charles Chihara gives a thorough critical exposition of modal realism, the philosophical doctrine that there exist many possible worlds of which the actual world -- the universe in which we live -- is just one. The striking success of possible-worlds semantics in modal logic has made this ontological doctrine attractive. Modal realists maintain that philosophers must accept the existence of possible worlds if they wish to have the benefit of using possible-worlds semantics to assess modal arguments and explain modal principles. Chihara challenges this claim, and argues instead for modality without worlds; he offers a new account of the role of interpretations or structures of the formal languages of logic.
Charles Chihara gives a thorough critical exposition of modal realism, the philosophical doctrine that there exist many possible worlds of which the actual world -- the universe in which we live -- is just one. The striking success of possible-worlds semantics in modal logic has made this ontological doctrine attractive. Modal realists maintain that philosophers must accept the existence of possible worlds if they wish to have the benefit of using possible-worlds semantics to assess modal arguments and explain modal principles. Chihara challenges this claim, and argues instead for modality without worlds; he offers a new account of the role of interpretations or structures of the formal languages of logic.
Charles S. Chihara is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley.
Introduction ; 1. Possible Worlds Semantics ; 2. Transworld Identity ; 3. Modal Realism ; 4. Forbes's Anti-Modal Realism ; 5. The Semantics of Classical Predicate Logic ; 6. Modality without Worlds: The Semantics of Modal Sentential Logic ; 7. Quantificational Logic ; 8. Modality without Worlds: Explorations, Developments, and Defences ; 9. Anti-Realism in Mathematics ; Bibliography ; Index
Erscheint lt. Verlag | 11.10.2001 |
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Verlagsort | Oxford |
Sprache | englisch |
Maße | 156 x 235 mm |
Gewicht | 527 g |
Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Logik |
Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Metaphysik / Ontologie | |
Geisteswissenschaften ► Sprach- / Literaturwissenschaft ► Sprachwissenschaft | |
Mathematik / Informatik ► Mathematik | |
ISBN-10 | 0-19-924655-6 / 0199246556 |
ISBN-13 | 978-0-19-924655-7 / 9780199246557 |
Zustand | Neuware |
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