Hard Truths
Wiley-Blackwell (an imprint of John Wiley & Sons Ltd) (Verlag)
978-1-4051-8815-9 (ISBN)
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Hard Truths is a groundbreaking new work in which noted philosopher Elijah Millgram advances a new approach to truth and its role in our day-to-day reasoning.* Takes up the hard truths of real reasoning and draws out their implications for logic and metaphysics* Introduces and takes issue with prevailing views of the purpose of truth and the way we reason, including deflationism about truth, possible worlds treatments of modality, and antipsychologism in philosophy of logic* Develops philosophically ambitious ideas in a style accessible to non-specialists* Will make us rethink the place of metaphysics in our daily lives
Elijah Millgram is E. E. Ericksen Professor of Philosophy at the University of Utah. He is the editor of Varieties of Practical Reasoning , and author of Practical Induction and Ethics Done Right . A former fellow of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences and of the National Endowment for the Humanities, Millgram's research is focused on theory of rationality.
Acknowledgments 1. Introduction Part I: Motivation 2. The Truth in Bivalence 3. Deflating Deflationism Part II: Arguments 4. How to Find Your Match 5. Unity of the Intellect 6. How Can We Think about Partial Truth? Part III: The Competition 7. Logics of Vagueness Part IV: Applications 8. The Quinean Turn 9. The Davidsonian Swerve 10. The Lewis Twist: Mind Over Matter 11. The Bare Necessities 12. Conclusion: Metaphysics as Intellectual Ergonomics Appendix: Was There Anything Wrong with Psychologism? Notes References Index
| Erscheint lt. Verlag | 31.3.2009 |
|---|---|
| Verlagsort | Chicester |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 164 x 241 mm |
| Gewicht | 598 g |
| Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Logik |
| ISBN-10 | 1-4051-8815-4 / 1405188154 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-1-4051-8815-9 / 9781405188159 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
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