Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings

Antony Eagle is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Oxford, and William Kneale Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy at Exeter College, Oxford.

Probability Primer Part 1: Degrees of Belief 1. Introduction 2.Truth and Probability, F. P. Ramsey 3. Subjective Probability: Criticisms, Reflections and Problems, Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. 4. A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism, James Joyce Part 2: Updating Degrees of Belief: Conditionalization and Reflection 5. Introduction 6. Why Conditionalize?, David Lewis 7. Probability Kinematics, Richard C. Jeffrey 8. Belief and the Will, Bas C. van Fraassen 9. Diachronic Rationality, Patrick Maher 10. Self-locating belief and the Sleeping Beauty problem, Adam Elga 11. Some Problems for Conditionalization and Reflection, Frank Arntzenius 12. When Betting Odds and Credences Come Apart: more worries for Dutch book arguments, Darren Bradley & Hannes Leitgeb Part 3: Evidence and Probability: Bayesian Confirmation Theory 13. Introduction 14. Bayesian Versus non-Bayesian Approaches to Confirmation, Colin Howson & Peter Urbach 15. Why I am not a Bayesian, Clark Glymour 16. Symmetries and Asymmetries in Evidential Support, Ellery Eells & Branden Fitelson Part 4: Evidence and Probability: Evidential Probability and Principles of Indifference 17. Introduction 18. Indifference: the Symmetries of Probability, Bas C. van Fraassen 19. Statistical and Inductive Probability, Rudolf Carnap 20. Is The Theory of Logical Probability Groundless?, D. C. Stove Part 5: Physical Probability: The Frequency Theory 21. Introduction 22. The Definition of Probability, Richard von Mises 23. Mises Redux, Richard C. Jeffrey 24. Mises Redux -Redux: Fifteen Arguments Against Finite Frequentism, Alan Hájek 25. Fifteen Arguments Against Hypothetical Frequentism, Alan Hájek Part 6: Physical Probability: Objective Chance and Propensities 26. Introduction 27. A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance, David Lewis 28. A Propensity Interpretation of Probability, Karl Popper 29. Objective Single-Case Probabilities and the Foundations of Statistics, Ronald N. Giere 30. Why Propensities Cannot be Probabilities, Paul W. Humphreys 31. David Lewis’s Humean Theory of Objective Chance, Barry Loewer 32. Resiliency, Propensities, and Causal Necessity, Brian Skyrms Bibliography Index