These essays by well-known scholars present the most significant recent advances in strategic choice theory.From the coalition's desert showdown with Saddam Hussein to the dieter's duel with himself in the midnight kitchen, strategic choices determine destinies. These essays by wellknown scholars - economists, psychologists, philosophers, and political scientists, inspired by master strategist Thomas Schelling - present the most significant recent advances in strategic choice theory. In activities ranging from gift giving to political wheeling and dealing, men and women strive ingeniously - though sometimes counterproductively - to secure desired outcomes. But as this book makes clear' the fundamental questions for strategy continually reappear: What factors motivate individuals' values and actions? What principles guide effective bargaining? How can incentives and decision processes be structured to yield desirable collective outcomes? In three parts, the book addresses many-player, fewplayer, and one-player situations. The first takes up questions such as: What outcomes result when an individual's welfare depends on comparisons with the situation of others? Under what circumstances do we expect many-player outcomes to at least resemble participants' desired outcomes? The second asks how we can build trust, distinguish between gifts and bribes, make commitments credible, or employ third parties to improve our bargaining position. The final part of the book focuses on the struggle of the individual decision maker. How does the recollected past influence one's evaluation of the present? How can we cope with errors in decision making? When should we rely on rules and principles, as opposed to the careful weighing of alternatives prescribed by the theory of rational choice? And - the most ethically challenging question - how shall we value human life?ContributorsVincent P. Crawford, Avinash Dixit, Jon Elster, Robert H. Frank, Jerry R. Green, Dale Griffin, Russell Hardin, Richard J. Herrnstein, Robert Jervis, Robert Klitgaard, Howard Margolis, Barry Nalebuff, Mancur Olson, Drazen Prelec, Howard Raiffa, Amos Tversky, W. Kip Viscusi, Richard Zeckhauser
Richard Zeckhauser is Frank P. Ramsey Professor of Political Economy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
The strategy of choice, Richard J. Zeckhauser. Part 1 Micromotives and macrobehavior - many players: positional externalities, Robert H. Frank; envy in social life, Jon Elster; free riding versus co-operation, Howard Margolis; systems effects, Robert Jervis; autocracy, democracy and prosperity, Mancur Olson. Part 2 Commitment and the strategy of conflict - a few players: making strategies credible, Avinash Dixit and Barry Nalebuff; trusting persons, trusting institutions, Russell Hardin; gifts and bribes, Robert Klitgaard; the strategic use of contracts with third parties, Jerry R. Green; Thomas Schelling and the analysis of strategic behaviour, Vincent P. Crawford. Part 3 Choice and consequence - just oneself: endowment and contrast in judgments of well-being, Amos Tversky and Dale Griffin; preferences or principles - alternative guidelines for choice, Drazen Prelec and R.J. Herrnstein; coping with common errors in rational decision making, Howard Faiffa; strategic and ethical issues in the valuation of life, W. Kip Viscusi.
