Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments

R. Jay Wallace is Professor of Philosophy at the Humboldt Universität zu Berlin.

Introduction The Problem The Solution Prospectus Emotions and Expectations The Approach Sketched Narrowing the Class Reactive and Nonreactive, Moral and Nonmoral Irrational Guilt Responsibility Responsibility, Blame, and Moral Sanction Responsibility and the Reactive Emotions The Reactive Account and Moral Judgment Methodological Interlude Understanding the Debate Strawson's Arguments Fairness Strategies Blameworthiness and the Excuses Excuses and Intentions Qualities of Will A Typology of Excuses Determinism and Excuses Accountability and the Exemptions Exemptions and Abilities Exemptions: Some Cases Determinism and Rational Powers Comparisons and Contrasts The Lure of Liberty Avoidability and Harm Opportunity and Possibility Difficulty and Control Oughts and Cans Conclusion Appendix: Further Emotional Vicissitudes Appendix: Alternate Possibilities Index