Arguments and Reason-Giving

Matthew W. McKeon is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Michigan State University where he has been Chair of the Department of Philosophy since 2011.

Chapter 1: Introduction

Part I: Arguments, Inference Claims, and Reflective Inference

Chapter 2: Reason-Giving Uses of Arguments
2.1 Preamble
2.2 Arguing and arguments
2.3 Arguments in informal logic, argumentation studies, and formal logic
2.3.1 Arguments in informal logic
2.3.2 Argumentation studies
2.3.3 Arguments in formal logic
2.4 Reason-giving uses of arguments
2.5 Conclusion

Chapter 3: Inference Claims
3.1 Preamble
3.2 Argument claims and uses of arguments
3.3 The connection between inference claims and reason-giving uses of argument
3.3.1 Inference claim and reasons for believing
3.3.2 Dialectical arguments and reason-giving uses of arguments
3.4 How, exactly, are inference claims conveyed by one's statement of an argument?
3.4.1 Mere implication
3.4.2 Conversational implicature
3.4.3 Conventional implicature
3.4.4 Assertion
3.5 Conclusion

Chapter 4: Reflective Inference
4.1 Preamble
4.2 Critical Thinking
4.2.1 Baseline characterizations of critical thinking
4.2.2 Inference and critical thinking
4.3 Reflective inferences and reason-giving uses of arguments
4.4 Conclusion

Part II: Formal Validity, Rational Persuasion, Argumentative Rationality, Intellectual Honest and Intellectual Integrity

Chapter 5: Reason-Giving Uses of Arguments, Formally Valid Arguments, and Demonstrative Arguments
5.1 Preamble
5.2 Deductive arguments, demonstrative arguments, and reflective inferences
5.3 Formally valid arguments and demonstrative arguments
5.4 Formally valid arguments and reason-giving uses of arguments
5.5 Demonstrative arguments and reason-giving uses of arguments
5.6 Conclusion

Chapter 6: Reason-Giving Uses of Argument, Invitations to Inference, and Rational Persuasion
6.1 Preamble
6.2 Invitations to inference are reason-giving uses of arguments
6.3 Invitations to inference invite only the inferences expressed by the arguments used
6.4 Indirect persuasion
6.5 Conclusion

Chapter 7: Reason-Giving Uses of Arguments and Argumentative Rationality
7.1 Preamble
7.2 Reason for belief and the rationality of belief
7.3 The Pragma-epistemic approach to argumentative rationality
7.4. The epistemic and pragma-dialectic approaches to argumentative rationality
7.4.1 The objective epistemic approach to argumentative rationality
7.4.2 The Pragma-dialectic approach to argumentative rationality
7.5 Argumentative rationality and good argumentation
7.6 Conclusion

Chapter 8: Reason-Giving Uses of Arguments, Intellectual Honesty, and Intellectual integrity
8.1 Preamble
8.2 Intellectual honesty and truthfulness
8.3 Reason-giving uses of arguments and intellectual honesty
8.4 Reason-giving uses of arguments and intellectual integrity
8.5 Conclusion

Index