Bloody Path to Valkyrie (eBook)

Chapter 3

The Illusion of German Invincibility

By the time of the Valkrie plot of 1944 the geo-political nature of World War II looked very different than it had begun with the invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939. The Wehrmacht no longer had undeniable control of Fortress Europe and had seen systematic and strategic defeats in North Africa, Sicily, Italy, and throughout the Eastern Front. Hitler’s debacle in sending his forces against the Red Army in 1941 was without a doubt one of two of the worst military stratagems of the war. Declaring war on the United States following the Pearl Harbor attacks was the other. Yet, it was hardly surprising that Hitler made any of the decisions he did during the war. Hitler’s decision to declare war against Soviet Russia, America, England and France, while allying Germany with Japan and Italy were written as an ideological blueprint in his autobiography Mein Kampf. Hitler had always planned to expand Germany to the East for his desire for Lebensraum, or “living space” for the “Volk” or communal people of the nation.12 Hitler took time in his autobiography to depict what he saw as the decadence and hypocrisy of World War 1 alliances which had left Germany defeated, alone, and humiliated following the Treaty of Versailles. Hitler in no short order declared should he ever rise to power all would be considered enemies of the states ranging from the French, British, Russian, Japanese and Czech, Jews, and the Catholic Church.13,14

Many Germans, especially veterans of the Great War (World War I) were swayed by Hitler’s arguments placing blame on the “stab in the back” theory and naturally sided with Hitler and the Nazis. Examination of the poor economic situation of the German republic following their defeat in the Great War served as catalysts for many German people flocking to a leader promising work and profit. Some historians have stated that the German people did not suffer in the events of WWI, nor following the Treaty of Versailles as much as German propaganda attempted to display during the rise of the Nazi party. 15

Arguably the historians are correct in stating that Germany did not suffer as much regarding than in comparison to France and England, its cities were not attacked, destroyed or otherwise occupied by enemy forces. However, Germany, is second only to Russia in the overall number of casualties sustained during the Great War with 7,142,558, killed missing, or wounded.16 Consider this in terms of how many have been affected by all of the sons, fathers, and brothers which did not return, and therefore did not contribute to reconstruction, labor force, or could not reproduce a new generations. This was also a large force which could not be used to train or supplement the German Wehrmacht during the Nazi rise. In the years after the end of the Great War, Germany has been described as a torrent of water without a river to contain it and going in all directions.

There were 33 political parties in the nation all vying for power and in the chaos the people screamed for control and stability. This desire for control and stability was deeply rooted in German society which was built upon rules, laws, and the desire to follow them both.17 Grudgingly historians must admit Hitler successfully garnered large worker’s unions and societal reforms in terms of economic sense which were said to contribute to massive decline in German unemployment and poverty in the 1930s. The Arbeitbeschaffung or “work-creation” system enabled the German economy to establish jobs and the Reichsautobahnen.18 While the infamous Autobahn undoubtedly added thousands of jobs across the nation it also provided a dual purpose to allow for the rapid deployment of German military units along wide corridors of the country. Above all else, Hitler cared little for changing social norms which did not support a militaristic nation. He envisioned a war in which he could fold Europe under the Nazi banner and geared the economic arena towards its support rather than education, science, religion, or medicine.

Regarding social norms, most would agree that there was nothing normal with the Nazi regime’s use of its society. Germany certainly included all ages and genders into its work force, including military and law enforcement agencies. Many of the administrative positions at the German High Command, Nazi offices, and concentration camps were run or managed by women, not to exclude the women married to Nazi elite who went along with their husband’s willful participation in atrocities and war.19 Ironically many of these women would be nicknamed “Hitler’s Furies” for their active roles in wartime atrocities. Germany and Soviet Russia were the first nations to actively pursue child soldiers for roles in combat or combat support. Nazi Germany established the Hitler Youth in 1933 and quickly demonstrated its preparedness not only to utilize children in war, but also the ability to look towards the future of a militaristic state raising soldiers from adolescence to adulthood with Nazi ideals.20 This was not out of the common for the German’s either when considering the use of the Wandervogel in November 1918; a group consisting of thousands of German youth, which were sent to the Western Front just before the German surrender and were ultimately massacred in battle.21 Sadly this would replay itself again when the Hitler Youth was ordered to participate in the final battles of the war including the defense of Berlin in 1945.

Hitler was simply unable to understand the realism of battle, thinking only of his racial hatred and limited understanding of economic affairs. Examination into the works by Wagenfuhr of the Statistiche Reichsamt (Reich Statistical Office) whose manuscript on the German war economy provided in detail German war time surveys on allied bombing campaigns as well as the output and function of German industry. “Wagenfuhr claimed that the characteristic feature of the German economy in 1939 and 1940 was “business as usual” in the peace-like war economy”.22,23 Ultimately any realistic economic approaches to a multi-front war, and the inherent massive and extravagant nature of German economic armament under Hitler and the Nazi party, were non-existent. This is in addition to the ridiculous and tragic use of thousands of German soldiers, police and civilians dedicated to the “Final Solution”, which including hunting down and arresting millions of innocent civilians, concentration camp security, maintenance, motor transportation and train rails. From a purely statistical and non-emotion or unmoral point of view this was a shortsighted decision which took thousands of soldiers and police off the battlefield. Hitler certainly had no issues with ordering or condoning children and women to serve in militaristic roles but failed to properly utilize the full potential of German society to support an already exasperated economy.

Italy remains an enigma for many researchers because of the poor choice of chosen ally by Hitler and the Nazis. Mussolini certainly sported a massive Army on paper, but the uncoordinated nature of the Italian military was a direct result of the lack of higher command joint strategy and planning. Unlike their German allies, the Italaian High Command (Comando Supremo) was highly inefficient and unable to achieve the strategic successes of their German counterparts. This often led to the military commanders conducting operations at will without oversight or strategic goals in mind. Italy’s failed invasion of Ethiopia in in the 1930s is a great exemplar of this disadvantage. Mussolini and his commanders should have foreseen the need for change but jumped into the expansive nature of World War II as Hitler’s sidekicks with little renovation in their military forces or economic industry. Additionally, the Italian war efforts were always focused on the wrong locations and never in line with greater Axis-European strategy, which was usually reliant on Hitler’s grand fantasies. This is not to say that Mussolini himself was any different in his delusion of grandeur when considering Italy was unable to effectively win any campaigns in the Balkans or Africa, yet still dreamt of rebuilding the Roman Empire under fascist rule.24

The Italian premature invasion of Yugoslavia in April 1941 is one such example. Italy’s feeling of marginalization that came from having been left out of the Polish invasion, forced German troops to jump into the conflict without proper operational planning when the Italian Army failed to meet its tactical goals. As such there was never a deep level of respect between the armies of the two Axis nations. This translated to a general distrust of German troops which were stationed in Italy or conducting joint operations with the Italian military in Africa and the Balkans. By 1943, the stationing of German troops in Northern Italy left many Italians to view them as occupiers; incidentally this included many Italians of which had never truly accepted fascism in the nation and slowly turned away from Mussolini and the Nazis.25 Mussolini for all his pomp and circumstance could never have achieved total utilization of this military and economic national capabilities given the lack of unification...