The Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism
Oxford University Press Inc (Verlag)
978-0-19-006822-6 (ISBN)
“Moral realism” is a family of theories of morality united by the idea that there are moral facts--facts about what is right or wrong or good or bad--and that morality is not simply a matter of personal preferences, emotions, attitudes, or sociological conventions. The fundamental thought underlying moral realism can be expressed as a parity thesis. There are many kinds of facts, including physical, psychological, mathematical, temporal, and moral facts. So understood, moral realism can be distinguished from a variety of anti-realist theories including expressivism, non-cognitivism, and error theory.
The Handbook is divided into four parts, the first of which contains essays about the basic concepts and distinctions which characterize moral realism. The subsequent parts contain essays first defending the idea that morality is a naturalistic phenomenon like other subject matters studied by the empirical sciences; second, that morality is a non-natural phenomenon like logic or “pure rationality”; and the final section is dedicated to those theories which deny the usefulness of the natural/non-natural distinction. The twenty-five commissioned essays cover the field of moral realism in a comprehensive and highly accessible way.
Paul Bloomfield is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Connecticut and works on issues in moral philosophy and metaphysics. He is the author of Moral Reality (2001), Morality and Self-Interest (2008), and The Virtues of Happiness (2014). David Copp is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Emeritus, at the University of California, Davis. He is author of Morality, Normativity, and Society (1995) and Morality in a Natural World (2007), and he has edited several anthologies, including The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory (2006). He is editor of a monograph series with OUP called “Oxford Moral Theory.”
Introduction
Paul Bloomfield and David Copp
I. ABOUT MORAL REALISM AND ITS VARIETIES
1. Defining Moral Realism
Jennifer Foster and Mark Schroeder
2. Metaphysical Structure for Moral Realists
Tristram McPherson
3. Moral Realism and Objectivity
Sigrún Svavarsdóttir
4. Epistemology for Realists
Sarah McGrath
5. The Bearing of Moral Rationalism on Moral Realism
Michael Smith
6. Does Anything We Care About Distinguish the Non-Natural from the Natural?
Mark van Roojen
7. Ethical Naturalism, Non-Naturalism, and In Between
Ralph Wedgwood
8. Can a Moral Judgment be Moorean?
William Lycan
9. Real Ethics
Simon Blackburn
II. NATURALISM
10. Ethical Naturalism: Problems and Prospects
Louise Antony and Ernesto Garcia
11. Ethical Realism and Robust Normativity
David Copp
12. Moral Functionalism
Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit
13. Function, Fitness, Flourishing
Paul Bloomfield
14. Realism about the Good-For Human Beings
L. Nandi Theunissen
III. NON-NATURALISM
15. Moral Conceptual Truths
John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, and Russ Shafer-Landau
16. Five Kinds of Epistemic Arguments against Robust Moral Realism
Joshua Schecter
17. The Explanatory Roles of Moral Facts and the Case for Moral Realism
Robert Audi
18. Derek Parfit's Non-Naturalist Cognitivism
Roger Crisp
19. Ardent Moral Realism and the Value-Laden World
William J. FitzPatrick
20. Oh, All the Wrongs I Could Have Performed!
David Enoch and Itamar Weinshtock-Saadon
IV. NEITHER NATURALISM NOR NON-NATURALISM
21. Response-Dependent Realism
Mark LeBar
22. Deflationary Meta-ethics
Paul Horwich
23. On the Properties of Quietism and Robustness
Matthew H. Kramer
24. Prospects for a Quietist Moral Realism
Mark D. Warren and Amie L. Thomasson
25. Moral Anti-Exceptionalism
Timothy Williamson
| Erscheinungsdatum | 30.09.2023 |
|---|---|
| Reihe/Serie | OXFORD HANDBOOKS SERIES |
| Verlagsort | New York |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 234 x 175 mm |
| Gewicht | 1293 g |
| Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Ethik |
| Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Metaphysik / Ontologie | |
| ISBN-10 | 0-19-006822-1 / 0190068221 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-0-19-006822-6 / 9780190068226 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
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