The Moral Epistemology of Intuitionism

Hossein Dabbagh is Assistant Professor in Applied Ethics at New College of the Humanities, Northeastern University London, UK, and Philosophy Tutor at the University of Oxford’s Department for Continuing Education, UK.

Acknowledgements

Introduction

Part I: Mind

1. Philosophical Intuition’s Mental Ontology

2. Moral Intuition’s Mental Ontology: Shifting from Philosophical to Moral Intuition

3. The Use of Intuition as Evidence


Part II: Epistemology

4. Shaping Classic Moral Intuitionism: An Examination of H. A. Prichard’s and W. D. Ross’s Ideas

5. Towards the New Moderate Intuitionism: Recent Revivals of Contemporary Moral Intuitionism


Part III: Neuroethics

6. Scepticism about Moral Intuition: How My Favoured Account of Intuition Rebuts the Neuroethicists’ Position

7. Scepticism about Moral Intuitionism: How My Favoured Account of Epistemological Intuitionism Rebuts Sinnott-Armstrong’s Position

Afterword

Notes
Bibliography
Index