The Fragmented Mind
Oxford University Press (Verlag)
978-0-19-885067-0 (ISBN)
Mental fragmentation is the thesis that the mind is fragmented, or compartmentalized. Roughly, this means that an agent's overall belief state is divided into several sub-states-fragments. These fragments need not make for a consistent and deductively closed belief system. The thesis of mental fragmentation became popular through the work of philosophers like Christopher Cherniak, David Lewis, and Robert Stalnaker in the 1980s, and has recently attracted increased attention.
This volume is the first collection of essays devoted to the topic of mental fragmentation. It features important new contributions by leading experts in the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and philosophy of language. Opening with an accessible introduction providing a systematic overview of the current debate, the fourteen essays cover a wide range of issues: foundational issues and motivations for fragmentation, the rationality or irrationality of fragmentation, fragmentation's role in language, the relationship between fragmentation and mental files, and the implications of fragmentation for the analysis of implicit attitudes.
Cristina Borgoni is Professor of Epistemology at the University of Bayreuth, Germany Dirk Kindermann is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Universität Wien, Austria Andrea Onofri is Profesor de Tiempo Completo and Head of the Philosophy programme at the Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí, Mexico
The Fragmented Mind: An Introduction, Dirk Kindermann and Andrea Onofri
I. Fragmentation: Foundational Issues and Motivation
1:Fragmentation and Information Access, Adam Elga and Agustín Rayo
2:Fragmentation and Coarse-Grained Content, Daniel Greco
3:The Fragmentation of Belief, Joseph Bendaña and Eric Mandelbaum
4:Fragmented Models of Belief, Andy Egan
II. Rationality and Fragmentation
5:Rationality in Fragmented Belief Systems, Cristina Borgoni
6:Fragmented but Rational, Seth Yalcin
III. Fragmentation and Language
7:Fragmentation and Singular Propositions, Robert Stalnaker
8:On the Availability of Presuppositions in Conversation, Dirk Kindermann
IV. Fragmentation and Mental Files
9:Do Mental Files Obey Strawson's Constraint?, François Recanati
10:Belief Fragments and Mental Files, Michael Murez
V. Fragmentation and Implicit Attitudes
11. Implicit Attitudes are (Probably) Beliefs, Joseph Bendana
12. Implicit Bias and the Fragmented Mind, Josefa Toribio
13. Rational Agency and the Struggle to Believe What Your Reasons Dictate, Brie Gertler
14. The Pragmatic Metaphysics of Belief, Eric Schwitzgebel
| Erscheinungsdatum | 04.10.2021 |
|---|---|
| Verlagsort | Oxford |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 160 x 241 mm |
| Gewicht | 718 g |
| Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Erkenntnistheorie / Wissenschaftstheorie |
| ISBN-10 | 0-19-885067-0 / 0198850670 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-0-19-885067-0 / 9780198850670 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
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