Overcoming Epistemic Injustice
Rowman & Littlefield International (Verlag)
978-1-78660-706-5 (ISBN)
Prejudice influences people’s thoughts and behaviors in many ways; it can lead people to underestimate others’ credibility, to read anger or hysteria into their words, or to expect knowledge and truth to ‘sound’ a certain way—or to come from a certain type of person. These biases and mistakes can have a big effect on everything from an institutional culture to an individual’s self-understanding. These kinds of intellectual harms are known as epistemic injustice.
Most people are opposed to unfair prejudices (at least in principle), and no one wants to make avoidable mistakes. But research in the social sciences reveals a disturbing truth: Even people who intend to be fair-minded and unprejudiced are influenced by unconscious biases and stereotypes. We may sincerely want to be epistemically just, but we frequently fail, and simply thinking harder about it will not fix the problem.
The essays collected in this volume draw from cutting-edge social science research and detailed case studies, to suggest how we can better tackle our unconscious reactions and institutional biases, to help ameliorate epistemic injustice. The volume concludes with an afterward by Miranda Fricker, who catalyzed recent scholarship on epistemic injustice, reflecting on these new lines of research and potential future directions to explore.
Benjamin R. Sherman is a full-time lecturer in philosophy at Brandeis University, specializing in ethics, epistemology, and the overlap between the two fields. Stacey Goguen is an Assistant Professor of philosophy at Northeastern Illinois University, specializing in feminist philosophy, philosophy of science, and social epistemology.
Introduction Ben Sherman / Part I: Managing Psychological Tendencies / 2. Becoming Less Unreasonable Mark Alfano / 3. Overcoming Stereotypes: What Could Our Goals Be? Stacey Goguen / 4. Conceptualizing Sexual Assault: Hermeneutical Injustice and Epistemic Resources Audrey Yap / 5. Structural Thinking and Epistemic Justice Saray Ayala and Nadya Vadilyeva / 6. The Inevitability of Aiming for Virtue Jen White and Alex Madva / 7. How to Stop Perpetuating Epistemologies of Ignorance Emily McWilliams / Part II: Curing Epistemic Injustice in Healthcare / 8. Epistemic Microaggressions and Epistemic Injustices in Clinical Medicine Lauren Freeman and Heather Stewart / 9. Epistemic Injustice and Stereotype Mapping in Psychiatry Elianna Fetterolf / 10. Returning to the 'There Is': PTSD, Phenomenology & Systems of Knowing Mary Catherine McDonald / 11. Are Naturalistic Conceptions of Health Epistemically Unjust? Ian Kidd and Havi Carel / 12. Epistemic Injustice in Surgery: The Impact on Women Surgeons and Trainees Katrina Hutchison / Part III: Arresting Epistemic Injustice in the Legal and Correctional Systems / 13. Reconstructing Legal Judgement in the Face of Epistemological Injustice Michael Sullivan / 14. The Episteme and Epistemic Injustice Lissa Skitolsky / 15. Carceral Medicine and Prison Abolition: Trust and Truth-telling in Correctional Healthcare Andrea Pitts / 16. Epistemic Injustice, Willed Ignorance, and the Treatment of Pregnant Women in Canadian Provincial Prisons Harry Critchley / Part IV: Learning to Overcoming Epistemic Injustice in Academia and Education / 17. Teaching as Epistemic Care Casey Rebecca Johnson / 18. When Testimony Isn't Enough: Implicit Research as Epistemic Injustice Lacey Davidson
19. Afterword Miranda Fricker
| Erscheinungsdatum | 18.07.2019 |
|---|---|
| Reihe/Serie | Collective Studies in Knowledge and Society |
| Verlagsort | London |
| Sprache | englisch |
| Maße | 151 x 219 mm |
| Gewicht | 481 g |
| Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Allgemeines / Lexika |
| Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Erkenntnistheorie / Wissenschaftstheorie | |
| Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Ethik | |
| ISBN-10 | 1-78660-706-9 / 1786607069 |
| ISBN-13 | 978-1-78660-706-5 / 9781786607065 |
| Zustand | Neuware |
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