James M. Buchanan (eBook)

Richard E. Wagner is Holbert L. Harris Professor of Economics at George Mason University, USA. He is Senior Fellow of the Academic Advisory Board at the Independent Institute, the James Madison Institute for Public Policy Studies and the Virginia Institute for Public Policy. He was co-editor of the scholarly journal Constitutional Political Economy from 1989-1997, and he is currently a member of the editorial boards of Constitutional Political Economy, the Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice, and the Review of Austrian Economics. He was one of Buchanan’s dissertation students, a co-author with Buchanan, and a faculty colleague for some 25 years.

1. Who Was James M. Buchanan and Why is He Significant?- Richard E. WagnerPart I:  Subjectivism and the Methodology of Political Economy 2. East Anglia, What Should Economists Do Now?- Robert Sugden3. Duke, Starting from Where We Are: The Importance of the Status Quo in James Buchanan- Michael Munger4. Brown, James Buchanan and the Properly Trained Economist- Peter J. Boettke, George Mason and Rosolino Candela5. James Buchanan and the “New Economics of Order” Research Program- Stefan Kolev6. George Mason, Emergence, Equilibrium, and Agent-based Modeling: Updating James Buchanan’s Democratic Political Economy- Abigail N. Devereaux, George Mason and Richard E. WagnerPart II: Public Finance and the Theory of the State7. The Conflict between Constitutionally Constraining the State and Empowering the State to Provide Public Goods- Lawrence H. White8. Fiscal Constitutions, Institutional Congruence, and the Organization of Governments- Charles Beat Blankart and David Ehmke9. The Irrelevance of Balanced Budget Amendments- David Hebert10. Subsidizing Health Insurance: Tax Illusion and Public Choice for a mostly Private Good- Mark V. Pauly 11. Inconsistencies in the Finance of Public Services: Government Responses to Excess Demand- Andrew Abbott and Philip Jones12. The Unproductive Protective State: The U.S. Defense Sector as a Fiscal Commons- Christopher J. Coyne and Thomas K. Duncan13. Contraception without Romance: The Entangled Political Economy of State and Federal Contraception Mandates- Marta Podemska-Mikluch and Gustavus Adolphus14. Samaritan’s Dilemmas, Wealth Redistribution, and Polycentricity- Meg Tuszynski and Richard E. WagnerPart III: Collective Action and Constitutional Political Economy15. Constitutional Reform: Promise and Reality- Dennis Mueller16. Constitutional, Political, and Behavioral Feasibility- Alan Hamlin17.  Blockchain and Buchanan: Code as Constitution- Shruti Rajagopalan18. Blockchains as Constitutional Orders- Chris Berg, Sinclair Davidson and Jason Potts19. The Questionable Morality of Compromising the Influence of Public Choice by Embracing a “Nobel” Lie- J.R. Clark and Dwight R. Lee.20. Beneficent Bullshit- Peter T. Leeson21. Groups, Sorting, and Inequality in Constitutional Political Economy- Jayme Lemke22. Votes, Vetoes, Voice, and Exit: Constitutional Protections in the work of James M. Buchanan and Vincent Ostrom- Roberta Herzberg23.  On the Definition and Nature of Fiscal Coercion- George Tridimas24.  Politics as Exchange in the Byzantine Empire- Adam Martin and James RuhlandPart IV: Ethics, Social Philosophy, and Liberal Political Economy25. James M. Buchanan: Political; Economist, Consistent Individualist- Viktor Vanberg 26. A Public Choice Analysis of James M. Buchanan’s Constitutional Project- Randall Holcombe27. Buchanan’s Social Contract Unveiled- Enrico Colombatto28. Constitutional Design and Politics-as-Exchange: The Optimism of Public Choice- Georg Vanberg29. Doing Liberal Political Economy: James M. Buchanan as Exemplar- Glenn L. Furton and Alexander W. Salter30. Buchanan, Hayek, and the Limits of Constitutional Ambitions- Donald Boudreaux31. James Buchanan and the Return to an Economics of Natural Equals- David M. Levy and Sandra J. Peart32. From Highways to Clubs: On Buchanan and the Pricing of Public Goods- Alain MarcianoPart V: Economic Theory as Social Theory33. In Defence of (Some) Vainglory: The Advantages of Polymorphic Hobbesianism- Jerry Gaus34. Toward a Rule-based Model of Human Choice: On the Nature of Homo Constitutionalus- Roger Congleton35. The Constitution of Markets- Geoffrey Brennan and Hartmut Kliemt36. The Extent of the Market and Ethics- Yong Yoon37. Why Roving Bandits Settle Down: Club Theory and the Emergence of Government- Andrew T. Young 38. Rules vs. Discretion in Criminal Sentencing- Daniel D’Amico39. Diagnosing the Electorate: James Buchanan in the Role of Political Economist- Solomon Stein40. From Models to Experiments: James Buchanan and Charles Plott- Gil Hersch and Daniel HouserPart VI: Money, Debt, and the Rule of Law41. Rules Versus Authorities:  Buchanan and Simons and Fiscal Policy- Marianne Johnson42. The Quest for Fiscal Rules- Lars Feld43. The Irresistible Attraction of Public Debt- Vito Tanzi44. Can there be such a thing as Legitimate Public Debt in a Democracy? De Viti de Marco and Buchanan Compared- Giuseppe Eusepi45. Consequences of the Anachronism of Fractional Reserve Arrangements- Leonidas ZelmanovitzPart VII: Buchanan in Relation to Other Prominent Scholars46. Italian Influences on Buchanan’s Research Program- Alain Marciano and Manuela Mosca47. Paretian Fiscal Sociology- Michael McLure48. Artefactual and Artisanship: James M. Buchanan and Vincent Ostrom at the Core and beyond the Boundaries of Public Choice- Paul Dragos Aligica49. The Calculus of Consent and the Compound Republic- Robert Bish50. Why James Buchanan Kept Frank Knight’s Picture on the Wall despite Fundamental Disagreements on Economics, Ethics, and Politics- Ross Emmett