Knowledge from Non-Knowledge

Federico Luzzi is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen.

1. Knowledge from knowledge; 1.1 The default view; 1.2 Knowledge counter-closure; 1.3 A schema for KCC failures; 2. Inferential knowledge from falsehood; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Warfield on inferential knowledge from falsehood; 2.3 Warfield against the 'proxy-premise' strategy; 2.4 Montminy's defense of the proxy premise strategy and his attack on KFF; 2.5 Responding to Montminy's Challenge; 2.6. Against the proxy premise strategy; 2.7. Schnee on KFF; 2.8 Accounts of knowledge from falsehood; 2.9 Conclusion; 3. Inferential Knowledge from Unknown Truth: 3.1. Introduction; 3.2. KCC and Modal Conditions on Knowledge; 3.3. Agoraphobia; 3.4 The breadth of the challenge; 3.5 DeRose's attributor contextualism; 3.6 Birthday; 3.7 Stanley's interest-relative invariantism; 3.8 Coral; 3.9 Knowledge from essential falsehood?; 3.10 Conclusion; 4. How to abandon knowledge counter-closure; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Epistemic 'hocus-pocus'?; 4.3 Replacing KCC; 4.4 Murphy on justification and belief; 4.5 Denying KCC: costs?; 4.6 Multi-premise inference; 4.7 Conclusion; 5. Testimony and knowledge from non-knowledge: 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Testimonial knowledge from non-knowledge; 5.3 Testimony and inference: a defeater asymmetry; 5.4 Second-hand knowledge; 5.5. Safety-based testimonial knowledge from non-knowledge; 5.6 Conclusion; 6. Memory and knowledge from non-knowledge; 6.1 Introduction; 6.2 Lackey's cases against KPS; 6.3 Señor's objections; 6.4 Factual-defeater-based case; 7. Knowledge from non-knowledge in inference, testimony and memory: 7.1 Inference, testimony and memory; 7.2 Conclusion.