Kant, Ought Implies Can, the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, and Happiness (eBook)

Samuel Kahn is associate professor of philosophy at Wuhan University.

IntroductionPart One. Ought implies can in Kantian ethicsChapter 1. Terminology and ExegesisSection 1. Terminology Section 2. ExegesisChapter 2. Arguments in Favor of OICSection 1. Kant’s argument for OICSection 2. The argument from explanationSection 3. The fairness argumentSection 4. The prescriptivist argumentSection 5. The argument from deontic logicChapter 3. Objections to OICSection 1. The appeal to alternate traditionsSection 2. The epistemic argumentSection 3. The ordinary language objectionSection 4. The appeal to culpable inabilitySection 5. The argument from past obligationsSection 6. The argument from simplicitySection 7. The argument from excusesSection 8. The appeal to Hume’s principleSection 9. The argument from reasonsSection 10. The moral satisfaction objectionSection 11. The appeal to obligations from nowhereSection 12. The argument from interdependenceSection 13. The argument from epistemic oughtsSection 14. The argument from feeling oughtsSection 15. The appeal to conflicts of dutiesSection 16. The argument from emphasisSection 17. The appeal to conversational implicatureSection 18. The exphi objectionPart Two. The principle of alternate possibilitiesChapter 4. Setting the stageSection 1. Frankfurt’s seminal attackSection 2. Conceding PAP but mitigating the consequencesChapter 5. The connection between PAP and OICSection 1. OIC entails PAP with respect to blameSection 2. Blame requires impermissibilitySection 3. Able not to and able to do otherwiseSection 4. Some concluding remarksChapter 6. The second line of defenseSection 1. The metaphysical premiseSubsection 1. Flickers and alchemySubsection 2. The dilemma defenseSubsection 3. The deterministic hornSubsection 4. The new dispositionalistsSubsection 5. Morally relevant alternativesSection 2. The moral premiseSubsection 1. PAP and OICSubsection 2. The W-defenseSubsection 3. Counterfactual interveners and knowledgeSubsection 4. The reliability of intuitionsPart Three. The duty to promote one’s own happiness in Kantian ethicsChapter 7. “Happiness,” “general duties” and the standard accountSection 1. “Happiness”Section 2. “General duties”Section 3. The standard accountChapter 8. The means to happiness, indirect duties and two arguments for a direct dutySection 1. Indirect dutiesSection 2. Two arguments for a direct dutyChapter 9. ObjectionsSection 1. Internal incoherenceSection 2. The universal desire for happinessSection 3. Happiness as a necessary endSection 4. A duty to promote one’s own happiness would be otioseSection 5. Happiness is impossibleNotesBibliography