Philosophy of Language

Alexander Miller is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Otago, New Zealand. He is author of Contemporary Metaethics: An Introduction (Polity Press, second edition, 2013), co-editor of Rule-Following and Meaning (Acumen, 2002) and co-editor of A Companion to the Philosophy of Language (second edition, Wiley-Blackwell, 2017).

Preface to the first edition

Preface to second edition

Preface to the third edition

Acknowledgements, first edition

Acknowledgements, second edition

Acknowledgements, third edition

Introduction

1 Frege: Semantic value and reference

1.1 Frege’s logical language

1.2 Syntax

1.3 Semantics and truth

1.4 Sentences and proper names

1.5 Function and object

1.6 Predicates, connectives and quantifiers

1.7 A semantic theory for a simple language

Chapter summary

Study questions

Further Reading

2 Frege and Russell: Sense and definite descriptions

2.1 The introduction of sense

2.2 The nature of sense

2.3 The objectivity of sense: Frege’s critique of Locke

2.4 Four problems with Frege’s notion of sense

2.5 Kripke on naming and necessity

2.6 A theory of sense?

2.7 Force and tone

2.8 Russell on names and descriptions

2.9 Scope distinctions

2.10 Russell’s attack on sense

2.11 Russell on communication

2.12 Strawson and Donnellan on referring and definite descriptions

2.13 Kripke’s causal-historical theory of reference

2.14 Appendix: Frege’s theses on sense and semantic value

Chapter summary

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Further reading

3 Sense and verificationism: Logical positivism

3.1 From the Tractatus to the verification principle

3.2 The formulation of the verification principle

3.3 Foster on the nature of the verification principle

3.4 The a priori and the linguistic theory of necessity

3.5 Carnap on internal and external questions

3.6 Logical positivism and ethical language

3.7 Moderate holism

Chapter summary

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Further reading

4 Scepticism about sense (I): Quine on analyticity and translation

4.1 Quine’s attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction: Introduction

4.2 The argument of "Two Dogmas" (part I)

4.3 Criticism of "Two Dogmas" (part I)

4.4 The argument of "Two Dogmas" (part II)

4.5 Criticism of "Two Dogmas" (part II)

4.6 Quine on the indeterminacy of translation: Introduction

4.7 The argument from below

4.8 Evans and Hookway on the argument from below

4.9 The argument from above

4.10 Conclusion

Chapter summary

Study questions

Further Reading

5 Scepticism about sense (II):Kripke’s Wittgenstein and the skeptical paradox

5.1 The sceptical paradox

5.2 The sceptical solution and the argument against solitary language

5.3 Boghossian’s argument against the sceptical solution

5.4 Wright’s objections to the sceptical solution

5.5 Zalabardo’s objection to the sceptical solution

5.6 The normativity of meaning?

5.7 "Factualist" interpretations of Kripke’s Wittgenstein

Chapter summary

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Further reading

6 Saving sense: Responses to the sceptical paradox

6.1 Linguistic meaning and mental content

6.2 Sophisticated dispositionalism

6.3 Lewis-style reductionism and ultra-sophisticated dispositionalism

6.4 Fodor's "asymmetric dependency" account of meaning

6.5 McGinn on normativity and the ability conception of understanding

6.6 Wright’s judgement-dependent conception of meaning

6.7 Pettit’s "ethocentric" account

6.8 Wittgenstein’s dissolution of the sceptical paradox?

6.9 Ginsborg’s "partial reductionism"

Chapter summary

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Further Reading

7 Sense, intention and speech acts: Grice’s programme

7.1 Homeric struggles: Two approaches to sense

7.2 Grice on speaker’s-meaning and sentence-meaning

7.3 Searle’s modifications: Illocutionary and perlocutionary intentions

7.4 Objections to Gricean analyses

7.5 Response to Blackburn

7.6 Strawson on referring revisited

Chapter summary

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Further Reading

8 Sense and Truth: Tarski and Davidson

8.1 Davidson and Frege

8.2 Davidson’s adequacy conditions for theories of meaning

8.3 Intensional and extensional theories of meaning

8.4 Extensional adequacy and Tarski’s Convention (T)

8.5 Tarskian truth-theories

8.6 Truth and translation: Two problems for Davidson

8.7 Radical interpretation and the principle of charity

8.8 Holism and T-theorems

8.9 Conclusion: Theories of meaning and natural language

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Further Reading

9 Sense, world and metaphysics

9.1 Realism

9.2 Non-cognitivism and the Frege-Geach problem

9.3 Realism and verification-transcendent truth

9.4 Acquisition, manifestation and rule-following: the arguments against verification-transcendent truth

9.5 Twin-Earth, meaning, mind, and world

9.6 Grades of objectivity: Wright on anti-realism

9.7 Two threats of quietism

Chapter summary

Study questions

Further reading

Bibliography

Index