Contestants, Profiteers, and the Political Dynamics of Marketization

Helen Callaghan is a senior research fellow at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies. She studied Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE) at the University of Oxford, obtained her Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University and enjoyed a Max Weber Fellowship at the European University Institute before joining the MPIfG. Her research focuses on the politics of corporate governance in advanced industrialized economies. She has published peer reviewed articles in Comparative Political Studies, Comparative European Politics, Journal of European Public Policy, Review of International Political Economy, Socio-Economic Review, and West European Politics.

Contents
Abbreviations
Acknowledgements
1: Introduction
1.1: The Puzzle: Market Liberalization Across Advanced Capitalist Democracies
1.2: Analytic Focus: Policy Feedback Processes
1.3: The Argument
1.4: Research Operationalization
1.5: Case Selection
1.6: Epistemology, Ontology, and Method
1.7: Outline
2: The Political Dynamics of Marketizing Corporate Control
2.1: The Marketization of Corporate Control as a Regulatory Challenge
2.2: The Marketization of Corporate Control as a Political Process
2.3: Economic Dynamics of the Market for Corporate Control
2.4: Economic Dynamism and Political Salience
2.5: Summary
3: Britain
3.1: The Prewar and Interwar Periods: Barriers to Hostile Bids
Puzzle 1: What prevented market-enabling reforms?
3.2: Turning Point after the Second World War: The Removal of Barriers to Hostile Bids
Puzzle 2: Why did incumbents' defenses crumble?
3.3: Subsequent Evolution of Political Support for Market-Enabling Rules
Puzzle 3: Why did pro-market groups prevail?
3.4: Summary
4: Germany
4.1: The Prewar, Interwar, and Postwar Periods: Barriers to Hostile Bids
4.2: Turning Point in the 1990s: The Removal of Barriers to Hostile Bids
Puzzle 1: What prevented market-enabling reforms?
Puzzle 2: Why did incumbents' defenses crumble?
4.3: Summary
5: France
5.1: Prewar, Interwar and Postwar Periods: Barriers to Hostile Bids
Puzzle 1: What prevented market-enabling reforms?
5.2: First Turning Point After the Second World War: State Supervision of Incumbents
5.3: Second Turning Point in the late 1960s: Steps Toward Marketization
Puzzle 2: Why did incumbents' defenses crumble?
5.4: Subsequent Evolution of Political Support for Market-Enabling Rules
5.5: Summary
6: Conclusion
6.1: Findings
6.2: Generalizability
6.3: Alternative Explanations
6.4: Value Added to Previous Research in the Same Empirical Domain
6.5: Broader Theoretical Significance
Bibliography