German Atrocities (eBook)

Aerschot.

The case of Dinant may be taken as typical. The evidence as to Louvain and Aerschot is not less incredible. We are asked to believe that at Aerschot34 the population of a small town suddenly rose in arms against a whole brigade, although the population was quite unprotected—“we ascertained that there was no enemy in the neighbourhood.”35 To explain this surprising and suicidal impulse the Germans produce—it is their only evidence—the statement of a Captain Karge, that he had “heard rumours from various German officers” that the Belgian Government, “in particular the King of the Belgians,” had decreed that every male Belgian was to do the German Army “as much harm as possible.” “It is said that such an order was found on a captured Belgian soldier.” Strangely enough, the order is not produced—not a word of it. Also, “an officer told me that he himself had read on a church door of a place near Aerschot that the Belgians were not allowed to hold captured German officers on parole, but were bound to shoot them.” He adds that he “cannot repeat the words of this officer exactly.”36

Louvain.

Let us now turn to Louvain. “The insurrection of the town of Louvain,” say the authors of the White Book with some naïveté, “against the German garrison and the punishment which was meted out to the town have found a long-drawn-out echo in the whole world.” Some twenty-eight thousand words are therefore devoted to establishing the thesis that the German troops in occupation of the town were the victims of a carefully organised, long premeditated, and diabolically executed attack on the part of the inhabitants assisted by the Garde Civique. Thus:

“We are evidently dealing with a carefully planned assault which was carried on for several days with the greatest obstinacy. The long duration of the insurrection against the German military power in itself disposes of any planless action committed by individuals in excitement. The leadership of the treacherous revolt must have lain in the hands of a higher authority.”—Summarising Report.

Great emphasis is laid on the formidable nature of the attack and the heavy odds against which the Germans had to contend. The fire of the Belgians was “murderous” (D 11, D 13), “fearful” (D 9), “violent” (D 36), “furious” (D 41); it was supported by machine-guns (D 28, 29, 37, 38, 40) and hand-grenades (D 46), and was materially assisted by Belgian soldiers in disguise (Appendix D 1, 19, 38), and by the Garde Civique (D 45, 46), who occupied houses with the most “elaborate preparations.” In spite of this careful preparation the German troops, who had been in the town six days and had there established the Head-quarters of a whole Army Corps (the 9th Reserve Corps), were so impressed by the “extraordinarily good” behaviour of the inhabitants that on the evening of August 25th, about 7.30 or 8 p.m., they were taken completely by surprise. “It was impossible to foresee,” says Lieutenant von Sandt (D 8), “that the inhabitants were planning an assault.” Other witnesses say, however, that “a remarkable number of young men” were observed congregating in the streets some hours beforehand. None the less the German authorities exhibited an ingenuous trustfulness and, what is even more remarkable, a complete disregard of the most ordinary police precautions, which will come as a surprise to anyone who has studied the German Proclamations and the drastic measures usually taken by them immediately upon their occupation of a town.

A “murderous” attack; German casualties—five.

Such was the situation when at seven o’clock on a summer evening (August 25th) of notorious memory, the deep-laid plans of the Belgian authorities suddenly and murderously revealed themselves. A German company of Landsturm37 was marching through the town; the main body of the German troops quartered there were engaged several miles away, and only a few details remained in the city. This small body of unsuspecting soldiers—a company numbers not more than two or three hundred men—were suddenly set upon, at a signal given by rockets, by trained marksmen of the Belgian Army and the Garde Civique, disguised as civilians, acting with the aid of machine-guns and hand-grenades and actively assisted by the greater part of a large civilian population. The fire, as various soldiers of the Landsturm testify, was not only carefully controlled and directed, but was “murderous” in the extreme. Yet, after carefully searching through their depositions, we find that only “five men of the company were wounded” (D 8)! Lieutenant Sandt and Dr. Berghausen feel constrained to explain these remarkably light casualties. They can only account for them by saying that in spite of the “carefully planned” and disciplined attack the Belgians, shooting from carefully chosen positions, shot “too high” (D 8), “at night” (D 8, D 9) although the light at eight o’clock on an August evening is usually remarkably good, and one of the witnesses (D 26) says that at 8 p.m. it was “fairly light.” The company appear to have disarmed the infuriated Belgians with remarkable ease, going into the houses two or three at a time (D 9), and finding the occupants apparently as docile as sheep, so that although found with arms in their hands they allowed themselves to be led out in “a crowd” and “immediately shot” (D 44). In one case, on entering an inn, the Germans found “behind the bar, a waiter,” who had apparently taken up this strong strategical position alone with “a case for shot placed by his side with the corresponding ammunition.” He also allowed himself to be led forth like a lamb to the slaughter (D 37).

Contradictory witnesses.

It is extraordinary also that although this murderous and carefully planned attack began at 7.30 “I had just finished my soup,” says Major von Manteuffel, who sat down to dinner at 7.30—(Appendix D 3), or at 8 p.m. (D 6), yet at 9 p.m., says Corporal Hohne, who entered the town with his regiment at that hour (D 36), “the conduct of the civilians was quiet and not unfriendly,” and his regiment was allowed to march right into the town—“up till then nothing noteworthy had occurred.” A N.C.O. of the same battalion says that “between 9 and 10 p.m.” the Belgians were standing about the streets; all was “quiet,” and they were “not unfriendly” (D 36). Another witness heard nothing till “9 or 9.30” (D 25). Another says (D 45) the signal was given at “9 o’clock.” To the same effect another soldier (D 18). What is even more remarkable is the statement of Major von Klewitz that at 4 a.m. the next morning, after the Landsturm had cleared the houses, the infatuated inhabitants opened fire on an Army Corps which appears to have arrived in the interval and was then “moving out to battle” (D 2); and the presence of a whole brigade of Landwehr (D 1) does not seem to have exercised any restraining influence on these insane civilians. Like flies to wanton boys was a whole Army Corps to the burgesses of Louvain, who killed it for their sport. The German authorities contend that, with intermittent executions, they tolerated this kind of thing for two whole days. They appear, however, to have borne a charmed life—the chief casualties among them were horses. Battalion Surgeon Georg Berghausen, in particular, who records as a remarkable fact that he once paid a hotelkeeper (“to please him and his employees”) for meals he had ordered, was “repeatedly shot at” the whole length of a street but never so much as hit. He thinks this was due to its being so dark, though whenever the witnesses are concerned to testify that the firing was undoubtedly by civilians, or by soldiers disguised as such, they can see “quite plainly.”

The Priests.

Never since the Day of Pentecost was there such a confusion of tongues. One witness labours to prove that no executions took place without a most decorous court-martial in the station square, the same soldier combining apparently the office of prosecutor and judge (D 38); another says that of “a crowd” of persons taken out of a house, the males were “immediately shot” (D 44); yet a third says that a body of hostages were placed in front of a machine-gun with an intimation that they would be shot as a matter of course if there were any more disturbance (D 37). It is admitted that a hundred civilians were shot, “including ten or fifteen priests” (D 38). One German witness says it is all the fault of the priests (D 38); another says it’s the fault of the Garde Civique (D 45)—both being apparently at some pains to exculpate the unhappy civilians. The quality of the evidence against the priests (and the civil population) may be gathered from the following deposition (D 42) of Captain Hermansen. He interviewed a priest who, he says, had behaved well on one occasion:

“I rejoined that if his clerical brethren had acted in that [the same] manner, the Belgians and we would have been spared many unpleasant experiences. He did not contradict me.”—(D 42.)

In witness whereof Captain von Vethacke comes forward and says:

“In so far as priests were shot they too had...