Goldman and His Critics

Hilary Kornblith is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA. He is the author of Inductive Inference and its Natural Ground (1993); Knowledge and its Place in Nature (2002); On Reflection (2012); and A Naturalistic Epistemology: Selected Papers (2014). Brian P. McLaughlin is a Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at Rutgers University, New Jersey. He has published numerous articles on topics relating to the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of psychology, and metaphysics.

List of Contributors vii

Foreword ix
Alvin I. Goldman

Preface x

Part I Reliabilism, Internalism, and Externalism 1

1 Internalism, Reliabilism, and Deontology 3
Michael Williams

Reply to Michael Williams

2 Goldman against Internalism 22
Laurence BonJour

Reply to BonJour

3 Historical versus Current Time Slice Theories in Epistemology 43
Thomas Kelly

Reply to Kelly

4 The Justification of Memory Beliefs: Evidentialism, Reliabilism, Conservatism 69
Matthew McGrath

Reply to McGrath

5 Unreliable Testimony 88
Elizabeth Fricker

Reply to Fricker

Part II Epistemological Trouble-Shooting and Social Epistemology 125

6 Process Reliabilism and Virtue Epistemology 127
Ernest Sosa

Reply to Sosa

7 Goldman on Evidence and Reliability 149
Jack C. Lyons

Reply to Lyons

8 A Naturalistic Approach to the Generality Problem 178
Erik J. Olsson

Reply to Olsson

9 Veritism and Epistemic Value 200
Duncan Pritchard

Reply to Pritchard

10 The Condorcet Jury Theorem and Voter-Specific Truth 219
Christian List and Kai Spiekermann

Reply to List and Spiekermann

Part III Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Mind, and Metaphysics 235

11 Knowledge and Reliability 237
Jennifer Nagel

Reply to Nagel

12 Goldman on Knowledge of Mind 259
Christopher S. Hill

Reply to Hill

13 Under Influence: Is Altercentric Bias Compatible with Simulation Theory? 280
Frédérique de Vignemont and Hugo Mercier

Reply to Vignemont and Mercier

14 Finding the Body in the Brain: From Simulation Theory to Embodied Simulation 297
Vittorio Gallese

Reply to Gallese

15 Embodiment in Perception: Will We Know It When We See It? 318
Chaz Firestone

Reply to Firestone

16 Cognitive Science and Metaphysics: Partners in Debunking 337
Jonathan Schaffer

Reply to Schaffer

Appendix: Alvin Goldman’s Publications 369

Index 379