Defending Husserl (eBook)

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Uwe Meixner, Universität Augsburg.

Uwe Meixner, University of Augsburg, Germany.

Preface: What is at Issue? 9
Remarks on the Method and the Manner of this Book 16
Chapter I: On Imagining 21
I.1 Ryle on imagining 22
I.2 Dennett (and Ryle) on imagining 31
I.3 Bennett& Hacker on imagining
I.4 Husserl on imagining 54
I.5 Wittgenstein (in contrast to Husserl) on imagining 79
Appendix to Chapter I: The German originals of the quotations from Husserl and Wittgenstein in Chapter I, and remarks on matters of translation 110
Chapter II: On Knowing the Inward Mental Life 123
II.1 Against privatism and eliminativism 123
II.2 Subjective and intersubjective knowledge of the inward mental life 136
II.2.1 Ryle and Wittgenstein against introspection (reflexive experience) 140
II.2.2 Wittgenstein’s argument against knowledge of the inward mental life 169
II.2.3 Wittgenstein and Gorgias 185
II.3 The true nature of consciousness, and its true epistemological consequences 192
II.3.1 The root of Wittgensteinianism 220
II.3.2 Knowing one’s own mind and the minds of others 229
II.4 Coda: the second-person point of view 239
Appendix to Chapter II: The German originals of the quotations from Husserl and Wittgenstein in Chapter II, and remarks on matters of translation 246
Chapter III: On Intending 267
III.1 A prologue: epoché 267
III.2 Technical intentionality-predicates 268
III.3 The great divide in intentionality theory – first part: Ryle (and Wittgenstein) versus Husserl 271
III.3.1 Rylean Husserl and non-Rylean Husserl 286
III.3.2 Does Husserl’s theory of intentionality lead to idealism? 299
III.4 The great divide in intentionality theory – second part: Wittgenstein versus Husserl 310
III.4.1 In corroboration of the thesis that Wittgenstein is an intentionality nihilist 326
III.5 Dennett’s nihilism regarding intentionality 335
III.6 Bennett& Hacker’s nihilism regarding intentionality
III.7 The Wittgenstein-syndrome in the theory of intentionality 351
III.8 Wittgenstein’s profundity 367
Appendix to Chapter III: The German originals of the quotations from Husserl and Wittgenstein in Chapter III, and remarks on matters of translation 371
Chapter IV: On the Literature 381
IV.1 Husserl without introspection? 381
IV.2 On the difficulty of saying the phenomenological truth in the best possible way 394
IV.2.1 Thompson on reflexive (or reflective) experience, inner experience, introspection 394
IV.2.2 Thompson on representationalism 405
IV.2.3 Thompson on imagining 409
IV.3 Was Husserl an externalist? 416
IV.4 Husserl’s theory of intentionality misinterpreted 439
IV.4.1 The Bell does not toll for Husserl’s theory of intentionality 454
IV.5 Four views of a Wittgensteinian 464
IV.5.1 The first view (concerning introspection) 464
IV.5.2 The second view (concerning Anscombe’s mistranslation of “Vorstellung” and, allegedly, of “Bild”) 467
IV.5.3 The third view (concerning the intentionality of imaginings 470
IV.5.4 The fourth view (concerning the ontological and epistemological status of imaginings) 474
IV.6 Among the blind, the one-eyed is king 480
IV.7 Referentialism and anti-referentialism 486
IV.8 Husserl and the Clash of the Four Giants 490
Appendix to Chapter IV: The German originals of the quotations from Husserl and Wittgenstein in Chapter IV, and remarks on matters of translation 503
Bibliography 513
Index of labelled quotations from Bennett& Hacker, Dennett, Husserl, Ryle, and Wittgenstein
Index of other quoted authors 527