Ineffability and its Metaphysics

Silvia Jonas is a Polonsky Postdoctoral Fellow at The Van Leer Institute and a Visiting Researcher at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Israel. She completed her PhD at Humboldt University in Berlin, Germany, and holds a BPhil in Philosophy from the University of Oxford as well as an MLitt in Philosophy from the University of St. Andrews, UK.

1. Introduction1.1 Getting a Grip on the Topic1.2 The Relevant Cases1.3 A Brief History of Ineffability1.4 Four Ways of Predicate Application1.5 Structure of the Book
2.Terminology2.1 Content2.2 Representations2.3 Experience2.4 Truth and Truth-Bearers2.5 Impressibility and Ineffability
3.Ineffable Properties and Objects3.1 Why Ineffable Properties and Objects?3.2 The Absolute3.3 Haecceities3.4 Bare Particulars
4.Ineffable Propositions4.1 Why Ineffable Propositions?4.2 Inaccessibility4.3 Semantic Paradoxes4.4 Unformulable Mathematical Propositions4.5 Excess Propositions4.6 Perspective Propositions
5.Ineffable Content5.1 Why Ineffable Content?5.2 Non-Conceptual Concept in Perception5.3 The Contents of Aesthetic Experience5.4 The Contents of Religious Experience
6.Ineffable Knowledge I6.1 Why Ineffable Knowledge?6.2 Objective Ineffable Knowledge6.3 Knowledge-How6.4 Basic Logical Knowledge6.5 Non-Representational Knowledge
7.Ineffable Knowledge II7.1 Subjective Ineffable Knowledge7.2 Indexical Knowledge7.3 Phenomenal Knowledge7.4 Self-Acquaintance
8.Conclusion