Rational Belief
Oxford University Press Inc (Verlag)
978-0-19-022184-3 (ISBN)
Rational Belief provides conceptions of belief and knowledge, offers a theory of how they are grounded, and connects them with the will and thereby with action, moral responsibility, and intellectual virtue. A unifying element is a commitment to representing epistemology-which is centrally concerned with belief-as integrated with a plausible philosophy of mind that does justice both to the nature of belief and to the conditions for its formation and regulation. Part One centers on belief and its relation to the will. It explores our control of our beliefs, and it describes several forms belief may take and shows how beliefs are connected with the world outside the mind. Part Two concerns normative aspects of epistemology, explores the nature of intellectual virtue, and presents a theory of moral perception. The book also offers a theory of the grounds of both justification and knowledge and shows how these grounds bear on the self-evident. Rationality is distinguished from justification; each clarified in relation to the other; and the epistemological importance of the phenomenal-for instance, of intuitional experience and other "private " aspects of mental life-is explored. The final section addresses social epistemology. It offers a theory of testimony as essential in human knowledge and a related account of the rational resolution of disagreements.
Robert Audi is an internationally known contributor to epistemology. He has published books and numerous papers in the field, and he lectures widely in epistemology and such related areas as ethical theory and philosophy of action. His epistemological books include The Structure of Justification (1993), The Architecture of Reason (OUP, 2001), Epistemology (3rd edition, 2010), and Moral Perception (2013).
Preface and Acknowledgments ; Introduction ; Part I. Belief: Its Structure, Content, and Relation to the Will ; Chapter 1 Dispositional Beliefs and Dispositions to Believe ; Chapter 2 Doxastic Voluntarism and the Ethics of Belief ; Chapter 3 Belief: A Study in Form, Content, and Justification ; Part II. Normativity and Virtue in Epistemology ; Chapter 4 Moral Perception and Moral Knowledge ; Chapter 5 Reliability as a Virtue ; Chapter 6 Knowledge, Justification, and the Normativity of Epistemology ; Part III. Epistemological Internalism and Grounds of Justification and Knowledge ; Chapter 7 An Internalist Theory of Normative Grounds ; Chapter 8 Theoretical Rationality: Its Sources, Structure, and Scope ; Chapter 9 Doxastic Innocence: Phenomenal Conservatism and Epistemological Common Sense ; Chapter 10 Skepticism About the A Priori: Self-Evidence, Defeasibility, and Cogito Propositions ; Part IV. Social Epistemology ; Chapter 11 The Place of Testimony in the Fabric of Knowledge and Justification ; Chapter 12 Testimony as a Social Foundation of Knowledge ; Chapter 13 The Ethics of Belief and the Morality of Disagreement: Intellectual Responsibility and Rational Disagreement ; Index
Erscheint lt. Verlag | 8.10.2015 |
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Verlagsort | New York |
Sprache | englisch |
Maße | 239 x 160 mm |
Gewicht | 570 g |
Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Erkenntnistheorie / Wissenschaftstheorie |
ISBN-10 | 0-19-022184-4 / 0190221844 |
ISBN-13 | 978-0-19-022184-3 / 9780190221843 |
Zustand | Neuware |
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