Being Good and Being Logical

James W. Forrester

Introduction Part I: Problems of Standard Deontic Logic Chapter 1: What Is Deontic Logic, and Why Should I Care? Chapter 2: Standard Deontic Logic Chapter 3: What Is Left for Deontic Logic? Chapter 4: 'Ought to Be' and 'Ought to Do' 1. The Two Kinds of 'Ought' Statements Differ in Meaning 2. The Two Kinds of 'Ought' Statements Have Different Logical Behavior 3. The Two Kinds of' Ought' Statements Do Not Imply Each 4. The Connection Between Counterpart 'Ought' Statements Is One of Pragmatics Chapter 5: Why Deontic Logic Needs a Semantics Chapter 6: The SDL Semantics of 'Ought to Do' Statements I: Deontically Accessible Worlds Chapter 7: The SDL Semantics of 'Ought to Do' Statements II: The Principle of Backward Translation Chapter 8: The SDL Semantics of 'Ought to Do' Statements III: Epistemic Problems Chapter 9: New Light on Old Problems Chapter 10: The Semantics of 'Ought to Be' Statements Part II: A New Deontic Logic Chapter 11: Rights and What Ought to Be Chapter 12: Can Duties Be Multiplied Beyond Necessity? Chapter 13: Moral Realism and the Need for a New Semantics Chapter 14: A New Deontic Semantics Chapter 15: Being Good and Being Logical: What Deontic Logic Ought to Be Part III: Deontic Logic and Practical Reasoning Chapter 16: Deontic Logic and Practical Reasoning