A Chance for Possibility (eBook)

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Alexander Steinberg, University of Hamburg, Germany.

1 Introduction 11
2 Supervenience 17
2.1 Supervenience 19
2.2 Covariance 23
2.3 Covariance and Ontological Priority 30
2.4 Covariance and Modal Supervenience 35
2.5 Modal Supervenience and Explanation 40
2.6 Explaining Explanations 48
A Strong and Global Supervenience 59
A.1 Kim’s Attempted Equivalence Proof 60
A.2 Non-Equivalence Examples 62
A.3 Restricted Entailment? 65
A.4 Against Restricted Entailment 67
3 Concrete Possible Worlds 73
3.1 Possibility and Possible Worlds 74
3.2 The Analysis Claim 76
3.3 Lewis Worlds 77
3.4 The Irrelevance Objection 80
3.4.1 Against IO1 81
3.4.2 Against IO2 85
3.4.3 Against IO3 90
3.5 Counterparts 93
3.6 Actual Problems for Lewis 100
3.6.1 Possible Non-Existence 100
3.6.2 Surprises 103
3.6.3 Actuality 105
3.7 Lewisian Explanations 111
4 Abstract Possible Worlds 117
4.1 Something from Nothing 119
4.1.1 Pleonastic Properties 121
4.1.2 Something-from-Nothing Entailment Claims 124
4.1.3 Property Concepts 131
4.1.4 True SNECs 139
4.2 Pleonastic Possible Worlds 156
4.3 Objections and Clarifications 171
4.3.1 Existence 172
4.3.2 Explanation 175
4.3.3 Competitors 181
5 Possibility and Probability 185
5.1 Initial Motivation 187
5.2 Different Kinds of Probability 192
5.2.1 Epistemic Probabilities 193
5.2.2 Objective Probabilities 198
5.3 The Temporal Structure of ‘Might’s 205
5.3.1 Might 205
5.3.2 Might Have 210
5.3.3 Different Readings 214
5.4 DeRose on ‘Might’ Sentences 218
5.5 Supervenience 228
5.6 Objective and Metaphysical Possibility 233
6 Conclusion 241
Appendix A Non-Nominal Quantification 245
Name Index 261
Bibliography 265