A Two-Dimensionalist Guide to Conceptual Analysis (eBook)

Preface 7
Contents 9
Introduction 13
1 What is conceptual analysis and what is the problem? 21
1.1 What is conceptual analysis? 21
1.2 From Frege to Kripke and Putnam 25
2 Two-dimensionalism and the necessary a posteriori 33
2.1 Two-dimensionalism 33
2.1.1 Primary and secondary intensions 33
2.1.2 Metaphysical plenitude and two-fold world dependence 37
2.1.3 Scrutability and canonical descriptions 42
2.1.4 Two-dimensionalism and Jackson’s descriptivism 46
2.1.5 Two notions of apriority 50
2.2 Modal illusions according to Kripke and according to twodimensionalism 54
2.2.1 Kripke’s two models of modal error 56
2.2.2 Doubts about the accounts of modal error 58
2.2.2.1 Doubts about the epistemic counterpart model 58
2.2.2.2 Doubts about the reference fixer model 65
2.3 Summary and outlook: What has been shown and what is yet to be shown 70
3 The challenge from the epistemic arguments 77
3.1 Primary intensions and the epistemic arguments 80
3.1.1 The primary intensions of natural kind terms 84
3.1.1.1 Vagueness 92
3.1.1.2 Intersubjective variation and the individuation of concepts . 94
3.1.2 Semantic deference and the primary intensions of names 96
3.1.2.1 The argument from Ignorance and Error 98
3.1.2.2 Deferential concepts and the alleged problem of circularity 99
3.1.2.3 Deferential concepts and apriority 104
3.1.2.4 Two methods for detecting deferential concepts and two problems for two-dimensionalism 106
3.2 Linguistic meaning, mental content, and two-dimensionalism 110
4 Primary intensions, defining the subject, and communication 121
4.1 Defining the subject 122
4.1.1 A case for the epistemic thesis 127
4.1.1.1 From (CJ) to (CJ+) – Schroeter’s improv model 129
4.1.1.2 From (CJ+) to (CJ++) 145
4.1.2 The failure of the semantic thesis 149
4.2 Two-dimensional communication 153
4.2.1 The semantic thesis 156
4.2.1.1 Communication involving indexical expressions 158
4.2.1.2 Communication involving proper names 163
4.2.1.3 Communication involving natural kind terms 167
4.2.2 The epistemic thesis 169
4.2.2.1 The importance of shared primary intensions 170
4.2.2.2 How primary intensions help to promote co-reference even when they are not shared 175
4.2.2.2.1 Proper names 176
4.2.2.2.2 Natural kind terms 178
5 Epistemic transparency and epistemic opacity 181
5.1 Arguments for ubiquitous opacity 182
5.1.1 Millikan 183
5.1.2 Putnam 185
5.1.3 Kornblith 187
5.2 Revealing opacity 194
5.2.1 Revealing opacity via the function of a term 195
5.2.2 Revealing opacity via considerations about hypothetical cases 197
5.2.3 Can opacity be determined a priori? 199
5.3 The value of opaque terms in conceptual analysis 206
5.3.1 Discovering essences 207
5.3.2 Variation in primary intensions 208
6 Scrutability, primary intensions, and conceptual analysis 213
6.1 Scrutability and primary intensions 214
6.1.1 From descriptivism to the scrutability thesis 217
6.1.2 A case for (CJ) 223
6.1.2.1 Argument from metaphysical plenitude 224
6.1.2.2 Arguments from the scrutability of specific kinds of facts . 225
6.1.2.3 Arguments from the absence of clear counterexamples 227
6.1.2.4 Arguments from the epistemic indispensability of scrutability 230
6.2 Semantic idealizations and epistemic reality 234
6.2.1 Are primary intensions too coarse-grained? 235
6.2.2 Scrutability for real subjects 239
6.2.2.1 The two-level model 245
6.2.2.2 Approaching ideal judgments 254
7 The trouble with definitions and the aims of conceptual analysis 261
7.1 The aims of conceptual analysis 263
7.1.1 Definitions – complete, partial, and absent 263
7.1.2 Reductive explanations 267
7.1.3 The Canberra Plan 274
7.1.3.1 Ramsey sentences, primary intensions and unique reference 278
7.1.3.2 The scope of the Canberra Plan 280
7.1.3.3 The practicability of the Canberra Plan 283
7.2 The trouble with definitions 286
7.2.1 Adequacy conditions for definitions 286
7.2.2 Objections to the eligibility of definitions 290
7.2.2.1 Objections from the relation between definiendum and everything else 290
7.2.2.2 Objections from the format of concepts 294
7.2.3 The absence of successful definitions and some reasons for optimism 297
8 Concluding remarks 303
References 309