Semantic Relationism (eBook)

Kit Fine is Silver Professor of Philosophy and Mathematics at New York University, and specializes in Metaphysics, Logic, and Philosophy of Language. He has held fellowships from the Guggenheim Foundation and the American Council of Learned Societies and is a former editor of the Journal of Symbolic Logic. He is the author of Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers (2005), and the co-author of Worlds, Times and Selves and Reasoning with Arbitrary Objects (Blackwell, 1985). He has also written papers in ancient philosophy, linguistics, computer science, and economic theory, in addition to the papers in his central fields of interest.

Preface.

Introduction.

1. Coordination among Variables.

A. The Desiderata.

B. The Problem.

C. The Contextualist Response.

D. The Dismissive Response.

E. The Instantial Approach.

F. The Algebraic Approach.

G. Relational Semantics for First-order Logic.

2. Coordination within Language.

A. Frege's Puzzle.

B. Rejecting Compositionality.

C. Semantic Fact.

D. Closure.

E. Referentialism Reconsidered.

F. A Relational Semantics for Names.

G. Transparency.

3. Coordination within Thought.

A. Intentional Coordination.

B. Strict Co-representation.

C. The Content of Thought.

D. The Cognitive Puzzle.

4. Coordination between Speakers.

A. Kripke's Puzzle.

B. Some Related Puzzles.

C. A Response.

D. A Solution.

E. A Deeper Puzzle.

F. A Deeper Solution.

G. The Role of Variables in Belief Reports.

H. Some Semantical Morals.

Postscript: Further Work.

Index

"Combines careful, detailed argumentation with inspiration and synoptic vision for the bigger picture. ... One can reasonably expect Fine's book to be a spur for thinking about these issues for many years to come." (Mind, October 2009)

"With characteristic brilliance and rigor, Kit Fine advances
a radically new conception of semantic structure that casts light
from an unexpected direction on the nature of compositionality and
the theory of direct reference."

Tim Williamson, Oxford University



"How can two sentences represent the world as being
precisely the same way, yet differ in meaning, and express
propositions that are rationally believed in different
circumstances? Echoing themes initially broached by such
philosophers as Hilary Putnam and David Kaplan, Kit Fine answers
with a novel conception of semantics uniting the two-sided
connection of meaning with mind and world, and culminating in an
ingenious, representationalist theory designed to incorporate
contemporary Millianism while accommodating traditional Fregean
intuitions. A delight to read, the book will be mined for its ideas
and arguments for years to come."

Scott Soames, University of Southern California