Mind, Brain, and Free Will - Richard Swinburne

Mind, Brain, and Free Will

Buch | Softcover
256 Seiten
2013
Oxford University Press (Verlag)
978-0-19-966257-9 (ISBN)
43,60 inkl. MwSt
Richard Swinburne presents a powerful case for substance dualism and libertarian free will. He argues that pure mental and physical events are distinct, and defends an account of agent causation in which the soul can act independently of bodily causes. We are responsible for our actions, and the findings of neuroscience cannot prove otherwise.
Mind, Brain, and Free Will presents a powerful new case for substance dualism (the theory that humans consist of two parts body and soul) and for libertarian free will (that humans have some freedom to choose between alternatives, independently of the causes which influence them). Richard Swinburne begins by analysing the criteria for one event or substance being the same event or substance as another one, and the criteria for an event being metaphysically possible; and then goes on to analyse the criteria for beliefs about these issues being rational or justified. Given these criteria, he then proceeds to argue that pure mental events (including conscious events) are distinct from physical events and interact with them. He claims that no result from neuroscience or any other science could show that there is no such interaction, and illustrates this claim by showing that recent scientific work (such as Libet's experiments) has no tendency whatever to show that our intentions do not cause brain events. Swinburne goes on to argue for agent causation, that-to speak precisely-it is we, and not our intentions, that cause our brain events. It is metaphysically possible that each of us could acquire a new brain or continue to exist without a brain; and so we are essentially souls. Brain events and conscious events are so different from each other that it would not be possible to establish a scientific theory which would predict what each of us would do in situations of moral conflict. Hence given a crucial epistemological principle (the Principle of Credulity), we should believe that things are as they seem to be: that we make choices independently of the causes which influence us. According to Swinburne's lucid and ambitious account, it follows that we are morally responsible for our actions.

Richard Swinburne was Professor of the Philosophy of Religion at Oxford University from 1985 until 2002. He is a Fellow of the British Academy. He is the author of many books on philosophical issues, most of them concerned with the philosophy of religion, but others concerned with space and time, probability, epistemology, and mind and body. He lectures frequently in many different countries.

Introduction ; 1. Ontology ; 2. Epistemology ; 3. Property and Event Dualism ; 4. Interactive Dualism ; 5. Agent Causation ; 6. Substance Dualism ; 7. Free Will ; 8. Moral Responsibility ; Additional Notes ; Index

Erscheint lt. Verlag 17.1.2013
Verlagsort Oxford
Sprache englisch
Maße 160 x 233 mm
Gewicht 394 g
Themenwelt Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Erkenntnistheorie / Wissenschaftstheorie
Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Metaphysik / Ontologie
ISBN-10 0-19-966257-6 / 0199662576
ISBN-13 978-0-19-966257-9 / 9780199662579
Zustand Neuware
Haben Sie eine Frage zum Produkt?
Mehr entdecken
aus dem Bereich
Vorlesung Wintersemester 1951/52. [Was bedeutet das alles?]

von Martin Heidegger

Buch | Softcover (2023)
Reclam, Philipp (Verlag)
7,00