Economics and Modern Warfare

Michael Taillard is a freelance research experimentalist and an Adjunct Professor of Economics at Bellevue University, USA. He received his PhD in Financial Economics and has an academic background that includes degrees in International Economics as well as International Finance, and military training at the Army Transportation Corps in Ft. Eustis, VA. His work includes economic research projects for The American Red Cross, theoretical study for the United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) on which this book is based, and consulting panels given at horror movie industry expos who ve since dubbed him The Econozombist for his work helping to build an accurate representation of the world after the zombie apocalypse. His interest in the military applications of economics stems from the time he spent as a United States Army Reservist and seeing the untapped tactical potential.

Table of Contents Acknowledgements Preface Introduction A Critique of Current Methods Embargoes Blockades Tariffs and Quotas Subsidies and Dumping Other Trade Sanctions Exchange Rate Manipulation Leveraging Humanitarian Aid Summary PART I: SUPPLY MANIPULATION Creating Shortages of Supplies Blockade Example: The Ostrogoths Sack Rome Supply Channel Example: The United States Civil War The Impact of Specific Supplies Strategic Targeting Creating Shortages of Capital Assets Funding Sources Trade Example: The Cold War Commercial Funding Example: Al Qaeda Reactions to Capital Shortages Creating Shortages of Human Assets Skilled and Unskilled Labor Skilled Labor Example: Nazi Germany and the Atomic Bomb Hiring Local Nationals Human Resource Management Physical Confrontation Measuring their Incentive to Attack Strategies in Anticipating Attack Resource Consumption Example: 23rd Headquarters Special Troops Strategies in Reacting to Attack Resource Infiltration Example: Merchant Raiders Systempunkt Targets Resource Mapping and Systempunkt Identification Systempunkt Example: Operation Pastorius Limitations and Failures of Supply Manipulation Market Destruction Black Market Trade Suggestions for Future Research PART II: TRADE MANIPULATION Preliminary Concept – Terms of Trade Definition and Application Implications of Altering Terms of Trade Industries to Target Preclusive Purchasing Altering Price and Supply Tungsten Example: Nazi Germany Optimizing Strategy Resource Appropriation The Value of Supplies Trade Example: Chinese Warlords Supply Exploitations Anticipating Black Markets Supply Exploitation Example: The Second Sack of Rome Secondary Impacts Tactical Hiring Labor Market Wage Equilibrium Altering Capital Ownership Social Dynamics Tactical Pricing Predatory Pricing Taking Advantage of Tariffs and Subsidies Price Discrimination War Profiteering Example: Waste and Fraud during OIF/OEF 'Insider Trading' Trade Agreements Finding Potential Partners Terms of Partnership Loyalty Currency Manipulation Currency Value Manipulation Currency Liquidation Example: China's Reserve of US Dollars Diverting Foreign Currencies Diverting Local Currencies Counterfeiting Altering Value of Demand Altering Value of Supply Limitations and Failures of Trade Manipulation Time Elasticity Problems Legal Concerns Suggestions for Future Research PART III: MARKET MANIPULATION Economic Intelligence Analyzing Economic Fluctuations Price Analysis Example: Black Market Diamonds in Nazi Germany Predicting Behaviors Based on Resources Counterintelligence Corporate Misinformation Example: Board of Economic Warfare Economics Style Information Warfare Controlling Enemy Example: 23rd Headquarters Special Troops Labor Exploitations Labor Disruptions Work Stoppages: Nazi Germany Expropriating Peoples Providing Honorable Option to Change Sides Conquered by Choice Example: Alexander the Great Westernization Culture Shock Example: The Wal-Mart Effect Equity and Debt Engineering Altering Ownership Structure Leveraging Key Industries and Businesses Equilibrium Redirection Increased Resource Consumption Employment Redistribution Decision Management Modeling Regional Statistical Variation Modeling Decision Management Optimization Resource-Based View of Warfare Combat Progress Model Implications of Model Relationship to Incentive Model Limitations and Problems with Market Manipulation Suggestions for Future Research Conclusion Summary Ethical Concerns Potential and Plans for Future Research Future Frontiers Afterword Index