Substantive Perspectivism: An Essay on Philosophical Concern with Truth (eBook)

Bo Mou is Professor of Philosophy [effective in May 2009] and Director of the Center for Comparative Philosophy at San Jose State University in California, USA. After receiving B.S. in mathematics, Mou obtained graduate degrees in philosophy from Graduate School, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (M.A.) and from University of Rochester, USA (M.A. and Ph.D.). Mou was President (2002-5) of the International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy (ISCWP). He has published widely in analytic philosophy, Chinese philosophy and comparative philosophy, concerning philosophy of language, metaphysics, philosophical methodology and ethics. His scholarly articles appear in such journals as Synthese, Metaphilosophy, the Southern Journal of Philosophy, Philosophy East & West, Asian Philosophy, the Journal of Chinese Philosophy and Polylog. He is contributing editor of Two Roads to Wisdom? –Chinese and Analytic Philosophical Traditions (Open Court, 2001), Comparative Approaches to Chinese Philosophy (Ashgate, 2003), Davidson’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy: Constructive Engagement (Brill, 2006), Searle’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy: Constructive Engagement (Brill, 2008), and History of Chinese Philosophy (Routledge, 2009). He is author of Chinese Philosophy A-Z (Edinburgh University Press, 2009) and editor (primary translator) of Truth, Meaning, and Method: Selections from the Philosophical Writings of Donald Davidson (Commercial Press, 2008) (in Chinese). Mou is currently finishing a monograph on reference and predication concerning the relation of language to objects and thought.

Preface 6
Contents 10
1 Starting Point and Engaging Background 12
1.1 A Summary of Substantive Perspectivism 13
1.2 A Variety of Distinct Projects in Philosophical Concern with Truth 18
1.2.1 A Characterization of Various Projects Concerning Truth 18
1.2.2 Further Explanations and Clarifications 22
1.3 A Background Debate: Deflatinism Versus Substantivism 27
1.4 Methods and Strategy 32
1.4.1 Methodological Considerations 33
1.4.2 Strategy of Argumentation 36
Notes 38
2 Case Analysis I: Tarskis Semantic Approach in the Metaphysical Project 46
2.1 Tarskis Strategy, Schema (T), and Convention T 47
2.1.1 An Analysis of Pre-Theoretic Understanding of Truth and Its Perspective Elaborations in Ordinary Language 47
2.1.2 Schema (T) and Convention T 53
2.2 Adequacy of Convention T: Two Diagnoses 58
2.2.1 Diagnosis I 59
2.2.2 Diagnosis II 62
2.3 Enumerative Character of Tarskis Definition and Its General Character in a Tarskian System 65
2.3.1 A Background Introduction 66
2.3.2 Conditions for Extending Enumerative Definitions to New Cases 68
2.3.2.1 The Definition-Extending Pattern Requirement 69
2.3.2.2 The Fixing-New-Sentence-Meaning Requirement 70
2.3.3 Convention T and Potential General Character of the Tarskian Definition 72
2.3.3.1 Can Convention T Meet the Definition-Extending Pattern Requirement? 73
2.3.3.2 Can Convention T Meet the Fixing-New-Sentence-Meaning Requirement? 75
2.4 A Tarskian General Definition of What It Is to Be a Truth Definition 77
Notes 84
3 Case Analysis II: Quines Disquotational Approach in the Linguistic Project 90
3.1 Quines Disquotational Approach 91
3.1.1 Quine's Dual-Character Interpretation of (T) 91
3.1.2 Dual Character of (T) or Two Different Equivalence Theses? 95
3.1.3 Is the Conflation of Two Equivalence Theses Justifiable? 97
3.1.4 Is the Conflation Innocent? 99
3.2 Deflationist Disquotational Account, Schema (T), and Deflationist PLD Argument 101
3.3 An Analysis of Multiple Facets of the Speech-Act Equivalence Thesis Concerning True 107
3.4 The Concept of Truth and the Linguistic Project 111
Notes 115
4 Case Analysis III: Davidson's Approach in theExplanatory-Role Project 118
4.1 Thesis of Truth Centrality Concerning Explanatory Role and Its Sub-Theses 119
4.2 Truth Nature, Truth Means, and Justificatory Norm 122
4.3 Truth Pursuit as Strategic Goal and Truths Pursuit as Tactic Goal 125
4.4 The Semantic-Ascent Version and the Paraphrase-Explanatory-Reduction Version of the TNG Thesis 128
Notes 133
5 Case Analysis IV: A Cross-Tradition Examination---Philosophical Concern with Truth in Classical Daoism 136
5.1 Truth Concern and Dao Concern 137
5.2 Truth Pursuit as Dao Pursuit in the Dao-De-Jing 140
5.3 Zhuang Zi on True Agent and True Knowledge: An Account of Truth-Pursuing-Agent Dimension of Truth Concern 147
5.4 From Dao-Language Deliverance of Truth Concern to Folk Language Deliverance of Pre-Theoretic Understanding of Truth 152
5.5 How the Cross-Tradition Examination Can Enhance Understanding 159
Notes 165
6 Substantive Perspectivism Concerning Truth 170
6.1 Substantive-Perspectivist Theory of Truth 170
6.2 On Adequacy of SPT (I): Substantive Nature of SPT and Its Transcendental-Perspective Character 177
6.2.1 Substantive Nature 177
6.2.2 Transcendental-Perspective Character of SPT 179
6.2.2.1 Transcendental Perspectivism: A General Meta-Philosophical Framework 179
6.2.2.2 Transcendental-Perspective Character 184
6.2.2.3 Transcendental-Perspective Character and Pluralist Approach 187
6.3 On Adequacy of SPT (II): Ontology and Ideology 190
6.3.1 Ontological Presupposition and Ontological Neutrality of (ATNT) 190
6.3.2 Ontology and Ideology of (STD) 193
6.3.2.1 Complexity of the Ideology of a List-Like Definition 193
6.3.2.2 T-Sentences and Some Distinct Notions of Truth 195
6.4 On Adequacy of SPT (III): A Unified Account of Non-Linguistic Truth and Linguistic Truth Predicate 201
6.4.1 From Non-Linguistic Truth to Linguistic Truth Predicate 201
6.4.2 A Moderate Semantic Redundancy Thesis 204
6.4.3 A Denominalization-Disquotation Thesis 206
Notes 208
References 216
Index 222