The Sources of Intentionality

Uriah Kriegel is an associate professor of philosophy at The University of Arizona. His work centers on consciousness and intentionality. His previous book, Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory, was published by Oxford University Press in 2009.

CONTENTS; INTRODUCTION; 1.1. THE CONCEPT OF INTENTIONALITY AND ANCHORING INSTANCES; 1.1.1. AN ANCHORING-INSTANCE MODEL OF NATURAL KIND CONCEPT FORMATION; 1.1.2. APPLICATION TO THE CONCEPT OF INTENTIONALITY; 1.2. EXPERIENTIAL INTENTIONALITY THE ANCHOR; 1.2.1. AN ASYMMETRY OF ASCRIPTION; 1.2.2. EXPLAINING THE ASYMMETRY; 1.2.3. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES; 1.3. 'EXPERIENTIAL INTENTIONALITY'; 1.3.1. DEFINITION; 1.3.2. EXISTENCE; 1.3.3. SCOPE; 2.1. A TRACKING ACCOUNT OF EXPERIENTIAL INTENTIONALITY?; 2.1.1. BACKGROUND: TRACKING THEORIES OF MENTAL REPRESENTATION; 2.1.2. REPRESENTATIONALIST THEORIES OF CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE; 2.1.3. EXPERIENTIAL TRACKING; 2.2. THE HOT ARGUMENT; 2.2.1. BACKGROUND: HIGHER-ORDER THEORIES OF CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE; 2.2.2. HIGHER-ORDER THEORY AND THE TRACKING ACCOUNT OF EXPERIENTIAL INTENTIONALITY; 2.3. EXPERIENTIAL INTENTIONALITY AND HIGHER-ORDER TRACKING; 2.4. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES; 2.4.1. 'INTENTIONALITY,' 'REPRESENTATION,' 'TRACKING'; 2.4.2. WHAT DO WE WANT A THEORY OF INTENTIONALITY FOR?; 3.1. BACKGROUND: INTENTIONAL INEXISTENCE AND INTENTIONAL INDIFFERENCE; 3.2. THE ARGUMENT FROM INTENTIONAL INDIFFERENCE; 3.2.1. THE ARGUMENT; 3.2.2. RESPONSES; 3.2.3. BRAINS IN VATS; 3.3. THE ARGUMENT FROM INTENTIONAL INEXISTENCE; 3.3.1. THE ARGUMENT; 3.3.2. RESPONSES; 3.4. EXPERIENTIAL INTENTIONALITY AS ADVERBIAL MODIFICATION; 3.5. OBJECTIONS TO ADVERBIALISM; 4.1. POTENTIALISM; 4.2. INFERENTIALISM; 4.3. ELIMINATIVISM; 4.4. INTERPRETIVISM; 4.4.1. INTERPRETIVISM ABOUT NON-EXPERIENTIAL INTENTIONALITY; 4.4.2. INTERPRETIVISM DEVELOPED; 4.4.3. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES; 5.1. ADVERBIALISM PLUS INTERPRETIVISM; 5.2. HIGHER-ORDER TRACKING THEORY PLUS INTERPRETIVISM; REFERENCES