Evidentialism and its Discontents
Seiten
2011
Oxford University Press (Verlag)
978-0-19-956350-0 (ISBN)
Oxford University Press (Verlag)
978-0-19-956350-0 (ISBN)
In this ground-breaking book, leading epistemologists challenge and refine evidentialism, the view that epistemic justification for belief is determined solely by considerations pertaining to one's evidence. Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, the leading advocates of evidentialism, respond to each essay in this engaging and illuminating debate.
Few concepts have been considered as essential to the theory of knowledge and rational belief as that of evidence. The simplest theory which accounts for this is evidentialism, the view that epistemic justification for belief--the kind of justification typically taken to be required for knowledge--is determined solely by considerations pertaining to one's evidence. In this ground-breaking book, leading epistemologists from across the spectrum challenge and refine evidentialism, sometimes suggesting that it needs to be expanded in quite surprising directions. Following this, the twin pillars of contemporary evidentialism--Earl Conee and Richard Feldman--respond to each essay. This engaging debate covers a vast number of issues, and will illuminate and inform.
Few concepts have been considered as essential to the theory of knowledge and rational belief as that of evidence. The simplest theory which accounts for this is evidentialism, the view that epistemic justification for belief--the kind of justification typically taken to be required for knowledge--is determined solely by considerations pertaining to one's evidence. In this ground-breaking book, leading epistemologists from across the spectrum challenge and refine evidentialism, sometimes suggesting that it needs to be expanded in quite surprising directions. Following this, the twin pillars of contemporary evidentialism--Earl Conee and Richard Feldman--respond to each essay. This engaging debate covers a vast number of issues, and will illuminate and inform.
Trent Dougherty graduated from the University of Rochester, where he wrote a dissertation arguing against the notion that whether one knows depends on one's practical interests. He is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Baylor University, where he regularly teaches graduate seminars in epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of religion. When not writing philosophy, he is usually riding a bike, often with his wife or one of his children.
PART I. EVIDENTIALISM AND DISAGREEMENT; PART II. VIRTUE CRITIQUES: EVIDENCE AND INQUIRY; PART III. EVIDENTIALISM AND SKEPTICISM; PART IV. "KNOWLEDGE FIRST"; PART V. INTERNALISM/EXTERNALISM; PART VI. EVIDENCE; PART VII. NEW SYNTHESES; PART VIII. REPLIES
Verlagsort | Oxford |
---|---|
Sprache | englisch |
Maße | 169 x 240 mm |
Gewicht | 676 g |
Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Erkenntnistheorie / Wissenschaftstheorie |
Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Metaphysik / Ontologie | |
ISBN-10 | 0-19-956350-0 / 0199563500 |
ISBN-13 | 978-0-19-956350-0 / 9780199563500 |
Zustand | Neuware |
Haben Sie eine Frage zum Produkt? |
Mehr entdecken
aus dem Bereich
aus dem Bereich
die Grundlegung der modernen Philosophie
Buch | Softcover (2023)
C.H.Beck (Verlag)
18,00 €
Vorlesung Wintersemester 1951/52. [Was bedeutet das alles?]
Buch | Softcover (2023)
Reclam, Philipp (Verlag)
7,00 €