Kant's Thinker

Patricia Kitcher is Professor of Philosophy, Columbia University. She is the author of Kant's Transcendental Psychology

1. INTRODUCTION; 2. INTERPRETIVE FRAMEWORK; 3. PREVIEW; 4. CURRENT WORK ON KANT'S 'I-THINK'; 2. LOCKE'S INTERNAL SENSE AND KANT'S CHANGING VIEWS; 1. LOCKE'S INFLUENCE; 2. LOCKE'S COMPLEX THEORY OF INTERNAL SENSE; 3. KANT'S VARIED REACTIONS; 4. 'INNER SENSE' IN RELATION TO KANTIAN 'APPERCEPTION'; 5. KANT'S USE OF 'INNER SENSE'; 3. PERSONAL IDENTITY AND ITS PROBLEMS; 1. LOCKE'S PROBLEM; 2. LEIBNIZ'S CRITICISMS AND ADDITIONS; 3. KANT AND HUME; 4. TETENS (AND HUME); 4. RATIONALIST METAPHYSICS OF MIND; 1. THE ROLE OF RATIONALISM; 2. LEIBNIZ'S ELEGANT 'I-THEORY'; 3. FACULTIES, POWERS AND SUBSTANCES; 4. RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY; 5. CONSCIOUSNESS, SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND COGNITION; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. LOCKE'S 'REFLECTION' AND LEIBNIZ'S 'APPERCEPTION'; 3. SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND OBJECT COGNITION; 4. SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS THROUGH SELF-FEELING; 6. STRANDS OF ARGUMENT IN THE DUISBURG NACHLA?; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. KANT'S OBJECTION TO THE INAUGURAL DISSERTATION; 3. PRINCIPLES OF APPEARANCE AND THOUGHT IN THE DUISBURG NACHLA?; 4. WHAT IS THE DUISBURG NACHLA?'S NOTION OF 'APPERCEPTION?; 5. FROM THE DUISBURG NACHLA? TO THE CRITIQUE; 7. A TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION FOR A PRIORI CONCEPTS; 1. KANT'S GOAL; 2. CLUES TO THE NATURE OF THE ARGUMENT; 3. THE FIRST PREMISE OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION; 4. APRIORITY AND ACTIVITY; 5. A 'TRANSCENDENTAL' DEDUCTION; 8. SYNTHESIS: WHY AND HOW?; 1. PROBLEMS TO BE SOLVED; 2. KANT'S DEFINITION; 3. SYNTHESIS AND OBJECTIVE REFERENCE; 4. FIVE SYNTHESES AND THEIR RELATIONS; 9. ARGUING FOR APPERCEPTION; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. 'I-THINK' AS THE 'COGITO'; THE ONE-STEP DEDUCTION FROM JUDGMENT; 3. WHAT KIND OF COGNITION IS AT ISSUE IN THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION?; 4. WHAT IS THE PRINCIPLE OF APPERCEPTION?; 5. THE APPERCEPTIVE SYNTHESIS OF RECOGNITION IN A CONCEPT; 6. COMBINATION AND SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE B DEDUCTION; 7. ARGUING FROM THE UNITY OF APPERCEPTION TO THE NECESSARY APPLICABILITY OF CATEGORIES TO INTUITIONS; 8. TRANSCENDENTAL APPERCEPTION, EMPIRICAL APPERCEPTION AND 'MINENESS'; 9. SUMMARY; 10. THE POWER OF APPERCEPTION; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. WHAT IS THE POWER/FACULTY OF APPERCEPTION?; 3. DOES THE FACULTY OF APPERCEPTION ENDURE? IS IT THE INNER PRINCIPLE OF A SUBSTANCE?; 4. DOES THE POWER OF APPERCEPTION INITIATE CAUSAL CHAINS OR PROVIDE AN IMPRESSION OF NECESSARY SUCCESSION?; 5. 'IS IT AN EXPERIENCE THAT I THINK?'; 6. ROOT POWERS, SCIENTIFIC IDEALS AND THE GROUND OF APPEARANCES; 11. 'I-THINK' AS THE DESTROYER OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY; 1. UNDERSTANDING KANT'S CRITICISMS; 2. KANT'S EARLIER AND LATER TREATMENTS OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY; 3. 'I-THINK' AS THE 'VEHICLE' OF THE CATEGORIES; 4. 'I-THINK' AS ANALYTICALLY CONTAINED IN THE CONCEPT OF THOUGHT; 5. DOES THE ANALYSIS OF COGNITION IMPLY THE EXISTENCE OF A THINKER?; 6. WHY CAN'T THINKERS KNOW THEMSELVES AS SUCH?; 12. IS KANT'S THEORY CONSISTENT?; 1. THE OLD OBJECTION; 2. THE MOST PROBLEMATIC PASSAGE (A251-52); 3. THE CONFUSION ABOUT THE CAUSES OF SENSATIONS; 4. A SECOND LOOK AT THE MOST PROBLEMATIC PASSAGE; 5. CRITICIZING RATIONALIST CONFUSIONS; 6. WHAT KANT'S EPISTEMOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS IMPLY; 13. THE NORMATIVITY OBJECTION; 1. PSYCHOLOGISM OR NOUMENALISM?; 2. SCRUTINIZING SENSATIONS AND ADDING 'TRANSCENDENTAL CONTENT'; 3. FORMING CONCEPTS AND ACQUIRING THE I-REPRESENTATION; 4. MAKING A PRIORI PRINCIPLES EXPLICIT AND TESTING INSTANCES; 5. NORMATIVITY AND THE I-RULE; APPENDIX: LONGUENESSE ON CONCEPT FORMATION; 14. IS KANT'S THINKER (AS SUCH) A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE AGENT?; 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. TEXTS LINKING THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL REASON; 3. AUTONOMY AND ACCOUNTABILITY; 4. INTELLECTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY; 15. KANT OUR CONTEMPORARY; 1. SUPPORTING AND SHOWING RELEVANCE; 2. TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS; 3. MUST RATIONAL COGNITION INVOLVE SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS?; 4. A SECOND HARD PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS?; 5. OTHER I'S