'Die Spiegelschrift Gottes ist schwer zu lesen' (eBook)

Friedrich Schleiermacher and Dietrich Bonhoeffer

While Karl Barth’s influence on the theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer is obvious,1 the impact of Friedrich Schleiermacher, the other great figure in modern Protestantism, is far more inconspicuous. Nevertheless, Schleiermacher, the church father of the nineteenth century,2 was of no little importance for Bonhoeffer’s early ecclesiology (1.). And Schleiermacher’s idea of religion was part of the background against which Bonhoeffer developed his own understanding of religion and faith (2.). When discussing both subjects in the following I will not so much ask if Bonhoeffer understood Schleiermacher correctly but show how what Bonhoeffer understood as Schleiermacher’s point of view became important for his own theology.

1. Ecclesiology

It is quite astonishing how many aspects of Bonhoeffer’s early ecclesiology are influenced by Schleiermacher, always in both appreciation and criticism. Bonhoeffer appreciates that Schleiermacher focuses on the church3 and correspondingly has a strong interest in the idea of social community.4 But Bonhoeffer criticizes the way this community is conceived.

In Bonhoeffer’s eyes, the concept of community is the crucial point of salvation history: the primal state is the »idea of unbroken community«5 (1.1); sin is the breaking of this unbroken community (1.2); the church finally is the reconciled community with God and with human being (1.3 and 1.4).

1.1 Social Community in the Primal State

Bonhoeffer pays tribute to Schleiermacher as »the first to speak of relationships in community in the primal state.«6 Schleiermacher recognized that the primal state not only means community with God (which in Bonhoeffer’s eyes »has always been recognized«) but also social community of human beings. Thus, Schleiermacher understood that »community [with God] and social community belong together.«7 He comprehended that »apart from [social] community ›there is no living and vigorous piety‹.«8 For Bonhoeffer, the insight »that human beings, as spirit, are necessarily created in a community – that human spirit in general is woven into the web of sociality«9 is of great importance. It is nothing less than the characteristic of creaturely existence: »The creatureliness of human beings […] can be defined in simply no other way than in terms of the existence of human beings over-against-one-another, with-one-another, and in-dependence-upon-one-another.«10 Being a creature means being created in social community.

While appreciating Schleiermacher’s emphasis on this primal social community, Bonhoeffer complains how Schleiermacher understands this community. Schleiermacher names as reason for the human community »the inner union of species-consciousness [Gattungsbewußtsein]« and »personal self-consciousness.«11 For Schleiermacher, this union has a twofold function: On the one hand, it is »the general source of all recognition of others as being of like nature with ourselves.«12 On the other hand, it is »the only source of the presupposition and the ground of the fact that the ›inner‹ is known and grasped along with and by means of the ›outer‹.«13 »This inclusion of the species-consciousness [Gattungsbewußtsein] in the personal self-consciousness and the communicability of the ›inner‹ through the ›outer,‹ which is connected with it, is the fundamental condition or basis of social life, for all human fellowship rests solely upon it.«14 Through the unity of species-consciousness and self-consciousness a person is connected with all the other persons by »a common bond of consciousness.«15

Bonhoeffer can summarize: »only in species consciousness does one human being encounter another.«16 It might not be precise to say that human beings encounter each other in species consciousness. However, the latter is the reason for their encounter.17

Bonhoeffer’s own understanding of human encounter is quite different. Certainly, Bonhoeffer as well discusses the general character of the human spirit. Like Schleiermacher, he is convinced that people »understand, express themselves, and are understood.«18 But Bonhoeffer distinguishes this general characteristic of the human spirit from the ethical I-You-relation, which is the place where people truly encounter each other.19 What is the character of such an encounter?

For Bonhoeffer, human beings truly encounter each other only in the ethical sphere of claim and responsibility. Here human beings »constitute limits, boundaries, or ›barriers‹ [Schranke, Grenze] for each other.«20 In the encounter with the other his or her claim is a barrier for me which forces me to decide if I want to answer this claim or not. The situation of responding to the other’s claim is basic for human community; here responsibility and personhood take place: »It is a Christian insight that the person as conscious being is created […] in the situation of responsibility, passionate ethical struggle, confrontation by an overwhelming claim; thus the real person grows out of the concrete situation.«21 Thus, the true encounter between two human beings takes place when »the other […] places me before an ethical decision«22. So, acknowledgement of the other is not possible through recognition of »others as being of like nature with ourselves« in the species-consciousness but only in the ethical situation. If I am truly acknowledging his or her ethical claim, then I’m acknowledging the other – as a You. And in this I am becoming a person.23

In Bonhoeffer’s opinion, the acknowledgment of the other as an I is neither given through the union of species-consciousness with self-consciousness and the nature of human spirit nor is it found through that encounter with the other as a You.24 The I of the other can be acknowledged only if the other reveals him/herself.25 This means that it is not the species-consciousness which makes the encounter with another I possible but his or her self-revelation: »there is no encounter with another person except that the person wills to reveal him/herself.«26 Such a self-revelation does not happen always; it only takes place from time to time and when the I wants to. Bonhoeffer himself distinguishes three basic structures existing in the church: »Einzelperson« (the I), the »community of persons« (the I-You-relations), and the »collective person«27 – or, put in pneumatological terms: »plurality of spirit,« »community of spirit,« and »unity of spirit.«28 Whenever Bonhoeffer argues that Schleiermacher somehow fails in understanding these ecclesiological structures the question of personhood turns out to be decisive. Idealism (which includes Schleiermacher in this case29) fails to understand the structures of the church because it does not see the necessity of the described ethical concept of the person.30

Nonetheless, Bonhoeffer acknowledges that Schleiermacher’s insight in the sociality of the community in the primal state is »an important doctrine without which the ideas of original sin and especially the church could not be fully understood.«31

1.2 Original Sin as Destroyed Community

In Bonhoeffer’s view, the main problem of the doctrine of original sin is how »the individual culpable act and the culpability of the human race« can »be connected conceptually.«32 Bonhoeffer stresses that Schleiermacher managed to connect both because he...