Crimes of Business in International Law (eBook)

Cover 1
1. Introduction and scope of inquiry 26
1.1. Motives 26
1.2. An inter-disciplinary and multi-language approach 29
1.3. The Corrie case example 30
1.4. References 31
2. The commission of crimes by business actors 34
2.1. Preliminary remarks: Interpreting the Rome Statute 35
2.2. Commission in Article 25 (3) RS in ICC jurisprudence and scholarship 40
2.2.1. ICC jurisprudence on commission and Article 25 (3) RS 41
2.2.1.1. The Lubanga judgment: Commission vs. commission 42
2.2.1.1.1. The Majority’s decision by Trial Chamber I: Differentiation, a hierarchy, and collective control in co-perpetration 42
2.2.1.1.2. Judge Fulford: Opposition by way of a plain(er) reading 43
2.2.1.2. The Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui case: Horizontal and vertical perspectives on control 44
2.2.1.2.1. The Majorities’ decisions of Pre-Trial Chamber I and Trial Chamber II: Control by means of a power apparatus in indirect perpetration 45
2.2.1.2.2. Judge van den Wyngaert: Opposition in another plain reading 48
2.2.2. Commission and Article 25 (3) RS in scholarly contributions 49
2.2.2.1. Article 25 (3) RS constitutes a hierarchical ordering of degrees of responsibility (principal) perpetrators are in control over the crime, (secondary) accomplices aren’t
2.2.2.2. All participants are equal under Article 25 (3) RS distinctions are made at the sentencing stage
2.2.3. Results and outlook: Implications for the scope of individual business actors’ responsibility under the Rome Statute 55
2.3. Review of perspectives on commission in ICC jurisprudence and scholarship 57
2.3.1. The ambivalent text of the Rome Statute 57
2.3.1.1. Textual perspectives in ICC jurisprudence 57
2.3.1.2. Textual perspectives in scholarship 58
2.3.1.3. Results: The Statute’s ambivalence from a textual perspective 60
2.3.2. The legal certainty perspective: More ambivalence 63
2.3.3. The punishment perspective: A superior expressive capacity of modes of participation as degrees of responsibility? 65
2.3.4. Commission and attribution: A comparative perspective under Article 21 (1) (c) RS? 67
2.3.4.1. Abstraction: Forms of attribution and the scope of commission 68
2.3.4.1.1. Attribution of physical acts and (derivation) of criminality 70
2.3.4.1.2. Implications for the sentencing stage 73
2.3.4.2. Representativeness and consistency 75
2.3.4.3. Results 75
2.3.5. Results and outlook: Towards overcoming ambivalence 76
2.4. Law and reality structures: Re-conceiving commission 76
2.4.1. Commission and the law’s subject matter: A typological approach to perpetration 77
2.4.1.1. Roxin’s Zentralgestalt: Indirect perpetration and the openness of control 78
2.4.1.2. Schünemann’s «base type» of Täterschaft: Law and relevant reality structures 82
2.4.1.2.1. Offense descriptions and the reality structure relevant to the protection of legal interests 83
2.4.1.2.2. The «base type» of perpetration 85
2.4.1.2.3. Perpetration and attribution 88
2.4.1.2.4. Perpetration and criminality 89
2.4.1.3. The law’s subject matter and the ICC: A region-specific account of the power apparatus in Katanga 90
2.4.1.4. Results and outlook: A normative-empirical perspective on commission under the Rome Statute 94
2.4.2. The type of commission under the Rome Statute 95
2.4.2.1. Offense descriptions under the Rome Statute: Key figures in genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes 96
2.4.2.1.1. Elements of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes 96
2.4.2.1.1.1. Crimes against humanity 97
2.4.2.1.1.2. Genocide 98
2.4.2.1.1.3. War crimes 100
2.4.2.1.1.4. Results and outlook: The reality of offenses under the Rome Statute as an organized effort 102
2.4.2.1.2. An anatomy of human interaction and involvement in genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes 105
2.4.2.1.3. Results and outlook: Designers and implementers of organized action as key figures 107
2.4.2.2. The Statute’s fundamental means-end-relation and its reality structure 108
2.4.2.3. The Statute’s commission type 109
2.4.2.3.1. The resource dimension of commission 110
2.4.2.3.2. The creative dimension of commission 112
2.4.2.3.2.1. Empirical complexity 113
2.4.2.3.2.1.1. Kelman and Hamilton on crimes of obedience 114
2.4.2.3.2.1.2. Total institutional power relations 116
2.4.2.3.2.1.3. Critical voices 117
2.4.2.3.2.2. Fungibility re-visited: On the empirical substrate of the (corporate) power apparatus 120
2.4.2.3.3. The commission type and prerequisite degrees of dimensional expression 123
2.4.2.4. Results and outlook: The commission type and individual criminal responsibility 127
2.4.3. The subject-matter’s influence on attribution, criminality, and individual degrees of responsibility 129
2.4.3.1. ICC: A dysfunctional control approach to indirect co-perpetration 130
2.4.3.2. Ambos and Vest: Multi-staged control 133
2.4.3.3. Collective criminality and individual degrees of criminal responsibility at the sentencing stage 138
2.4.3.3.1. Cooperative conduct, shared creatorship of the result and individual quotas of criminality 139
2.4.3.3.2. Sentencing and degrees of criminal responsibility as labels 147
2.4.3.4. Results and outlook 149
2.4.4. Commission and Article 25 (3) RS: Re-visiting the text from a typological perspective 151
2.4.4.1. Commission as an individual? 152
2.4.4.2. Prescriptive terminological elements in a descriptive provision 153
2.4.4.2.1. The regardless- and commission-clauses 154
2.4.4.2.2. (Additional) Intent prerequisites in sub-sections (c) and (d)? 155
2.4.4.3. Results 157
2.4.5. Commission and joint criminal enterprise: Lessons learned? 158
2.4.5.1. JCE responsibility re-visited 159
2.4.5.1.1. Central issues 160
2.4.5.1.2. … and responses 163
2.4.5.2. JCE, the genesis of Article 25 (3) (d) RS, and collective responsibility 165
2.4.6. Results and outlook: Business actors’ individual criminal responsibility for commission 169
2.5. Social value of conduct, Article 21 (3) RS and the ICC as a just global institution 172
2.5.1. The notions of proximity and remoteness 173
2.5.2. Focusing on intent: The Rome Statute’s alleged underinclusiveness vis-à-vis acts of business exchange 174
2.5.2.1. Genesis: Purpose as desire intent à la Learned Hand? 176
2.5.2.1.1. Methodological objection: Re-reading the MPC’s drafting history 179
2.5.2.1.2. Substantive objection: The purpose prerequisite’s deep roots in common law 185
2.5.2.2. Purpose and (the perception of) normalcy 188
2.5.2.2.1. Two scenarios 188
2.5.2.2.2. The issue of normalcy 191
2.5.2.3. Context and ordinary meaning: Purpose as certainty intent? 192
2.5.2.3.1. Vest: The context of Article 25 (3) (c) RS 193
2.5.2.3.2. The ordinary meaning of Article 25 (3) (c) RS: Language differences and certainty intent 195
2.5.2.3.2.1. Dictionary approach 195
2.5.2.3.2.2. Conceptual approach 196
2.5.2.3.2.2.1. Purpose as direct but not oblique intent 197
2.5.2.3.2.2.2. En vue de as dol spécial 198
2.5.2.3.2.2.3. Con el propósito 199
2.5.2.3.2.2.4. Result: Difference of meaning 199
2.5.2.3.2.3. Resolution pursuant to Article 33 VCLT 200
2.5.3. The emergence of the risk standard 202
2.5.3.1. Essential transactions 203
2.5.3.2. «Substantial» assistance, «significant» contributions, and overbreadth in Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana 204
2.5.3.3. Ambos and Vest: Limiting (secondary) participation to socially undesirable acts by recourse to a risk standard 207
2.5.3.4. Heyer: Crime-specific risks and the securing of livelihood 208
2.5.3.4.1. A utilitarian premise 209
2.5.3.4.2. … and its implementation in a risk permission 211
2.5.3.5. Results and outlook 212
2.5.4. Risk permissions from a human rights perspective: Liberty vs. security and business activity 213
2.5.4.1. Balancing liberty and security and the fate of the shopkeeper: Exemplary domestic perspectives on risk permissions 215
2.5.4.1.1. Balancing interests and protecting trust 216
2.5.4.1.2. The normative value of interests: Constitutionalization and social desirability 220
2.5.4.1.2.1. Balancing as a method 221
2.5.4.1.2.2. Criminal law and constitutional law 224
2.5.4.2. Risk permissions and Article 21 (3) RS: The human rights perspective 225
2.5.4.2.1. International law, the public law paradigm, and balancing of human rights under Article 21 (3) RS 227
2.5.4.2.1.1. Global constitutionalism and international law as a coherent system 230
2.5.4.2.1.2. Human rights as principles: A rational account of balancing 231
2.5.4.2.1.2.1. Principles as optimization requirements: The constitutional domestic perspective 232
2.5.4.2.1.2.2. Principles as optimization requirements in the public law paradigm: The international constitutional perspective 236
2.5.4.2.1.2.3. Human rights as principles in international law 237
2.5.4.2.1.3. Results: Constitutionalization of international law, Article 21 (3) RS and risk permissions 238
2.5.4.2.2. The scope of internationally recognized human rights in Article 21 (3) RS 239
2.5.4.2.2.1. Honest unevenness in a «contextual» approach to «internationally recognized»? 240
2.5.4.2.2.2. Implications: Uneven human rights protection of business actors before the ICC? 242
2.5.4.2.2.2.1. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR: Protecting solidified interests in economic and professional liberty as a human right 243
2.5.4.2.2.2.2. Interference by criminalization of acts of business exchange 245
2.5.4.2.2.2.3. Uneven protection of human rights in a «contextual approach» before the ICC 247
2.5.4.2.2.3. «Internationally recognized» and the ICC as a just global institution: A material perspective on global justice within the public law paradigm 248
2.5.4.2.2.3.1. Rawls on domestic social justice 251
2.5.4.2.2.3.2. Rawls on international justice 253
2.5.4.2.2.3.3. Global cosmopolitan justice 257
2.5.4.2.2.3.4. International justice and the ICC 260
2.5.4.2.2.3.5. Global justice and the ICC as a just global institution 262
2.5.4.2.3. Results and outlook: Re-visiting contextual vs. minimalist readings of «internationally recognized» and implications for acts of business exchange 266
2.5.4.3. Risk permissions for acts of business exchange in a principled account of balancing 268
2.5.4.3.1. The protective principle: Individual and collective? 269
2.5.4.3.2. Individual relations of precedence 273
2.5.4.3.2.1. The principle of possession and the ability to trust in business partners 275
2.5.4.3.2.1.1. Intensity of non-satisfaction of the principle of possession 275
2.5.4.3.2.1.2. Importance of satisfying the protective principle 278
2.5.4.3.2.1.3. Realization to the factually greatest extent 279
2.5.4.3.2.1.4. Abstract weight of the protective principle and of the principle of possession 280
2.5.4.3.2.1.5. Application to case example 281
2.5.4.3.2.2. The principle of adequate living conditions through work 283
2.5.4.4. Results: Implementation of an individual risk permission is generally not required 285
2.5.4.5. Revisiting Heyer’s utilitarian account of risk permissions for business actors 285
2.5.4.5.1. Wresting the singularity of life from the calculus of social interests: The criteria of securing one’s livelihood and of organizational competence 286
2.5.4.5.2. The criterion of risk specificity 293
2.5.4.5.3. Neutralization and perpetration 296
2.5.5. Results 297
2.5.6. Excursus: A customary law perspective on risk permissions? Business activity post-Nuremberg under Article 21 (1) (b) RS 298
2.6. Conclusion 300
2.7. References 301
3. Business actors as civilian superiors 327
3.1. Civilian «effective authority and control» in scholarship and jurisprudence 327
3.1.1. Scholarly views on business actors as civilian superiors 328
3.1.2. The Bemba case and ad hoc jurisprudence: A critical prognosis 331
3.1.2.1. Ad hoc jurisprudence on civilian «effective control» as the ability to report 332
3.1.2.2. Musema before the ICTR: «Legal and financial control» as business actors’ «effective control»? 336
3.1.2.3. Nahimana et al. before the ICTR: Analyzing corporate structures 338
3.1.2.4. Issues raised in ad hoc jurisprudence and by recourse to it 339
3.1.2.4.1. Substantive issues: The nature and scope of civilian «effective control» 340
3.1.2.4.2. Methodological issues: Sources of law under Article 21 (1) RS 341
3.1.3. Results and outlook 343
3.2. Omission as a type and business actors as civilian superiors 344
3.2.1. Schünemann’s typological perspective on omission 344
3.2.2. A typological perspective on omission under the Rome Statute: The genesis of Article 28 RS and the Rome Statute’s omission type 345
3.2.2.1. The genesis of Article 28 RS 346
3.2.2.2. The Statute’s omission type and its concretization with a view to conduct of civilian superiors 349
3.2.2.3. Collective criminality and individual degrees of responsibility at the sentencing stage 354
3.2.2.3.1. Attribution and criminality in scholarship 354
3.2.2.3.2. An analogous proposal 356
3.2.3. Results and outlook: Business leaders as civilian superiors and the question of social desirability 360
3.3. A risk permission for civilian superiors? 361
3.3.1. Scholarship on conscious disregard 362
3.3.2. Balancing human rights as principles 363
3.3.3. Result: No risk permission for business leaders as civilian superiors 364
3.4. Conclusion 365
3.5. References 365
4. Corporate criminal responsibility de lege ferenda? 370
4.1. The Rome Conference proposal and its discussion in scholarship 371
4.2. Corporate criminal responsibility under the constraints of reality 373
4.2.1. Criminal sanctions against corporate actors: A disjunction between burden and responsibility? 375
4.2.1.1. Punishing the corporation 377
4.2.1.2. An epistemological review 377
4.2.1.3. Incompatible perspectives 380
4.2.2. Non-criminal sanctions against corporate actors under the Rome Statute: The Rome Statute as criminal law? 382
4.3. Excursus: The corporate organization as a black box? 385
4.3.1. The «corporate veil» 386
4.3.2. …and how to lift it 387
4.3.3. Domestic experiences 388
4.3.4. Result 388
4.4. Conclusion 389
4.5. References 390
5. Closing remarks 397
6. Annex: Abstract and Theses 398
Thesis 1: Interpretative efforts regarding Articles 25 (3) and 28 (b) RS by the ICC and in scholarship largely preclude the prosecution of business actors but are not persuasive. 398
Thesis 2: These shortcomings can be remedied by a typological approach to commission and omission. 399
Thesis 3: The Statute's commission (omission) type consists of the ability to take decisions significant for the violation of protected legal interests by (not preventing the) devising or implementing of an intellectual design. 399
Thesis 4: The commission and omission types are two-dimensional. 399
Thesis 5: The criminality of conduct is collective and qualitatively the same for all actors. 400
Thesis 6: The social value of business activity does not call for a risk permission under the Statute. 400
Thesis 7: A policy decision extending the ICC’s jurisdiction to business corporations would be premature. 401