Competition, Innovation, and Antitrust (eBook)

Preface 6
Contents 16
1. Competition, Leadership and Entry 20
1.1 A Simple Model of Competition in Quantities 23
1.2 Increasing Marginal Costs and Product Differentiation 34
1.3 A Simple Model of Competition in Prices 39
1.4 A Simple Model of Competition for the Market 44
1.5 Conclusions 53
1.6 Appendix 55
2. Strategic Commitments and Endogenous Entry 59
2.1 Market Structure 62
2.2 Nash Equilibrium 66
2.3 Marshall Equilibrium 67
2.4 Competition in Quantities, in Prices and for the Market 68
2.5 Strategic Investments 77
2.6 Cost Reductions and Signaling 84
2.7 Advertising and Demand Enhancing Investments 88
2.8 Debt and the Optimal Financial Structure 90
2.9 Network Externalities and Two-Sided Markets 94
2.10 Bundling 97
2.11 Vertical Restraints 100
2.12 Price Discrimination 102
2.13 Antitrust and Horizontal Mergers 105
2.14 Conclusions 107
3. Stackelberg Competition and Endogenous Entry 108
3.1 Stackelberg Equilibrium 111
3.2 Stackelberg Equilibrium with Endogenous Entry 114
3.3 Competition in Quantities, in Prices and for the Market 117
3.4 Asymmetries, Multiple Leaders and Multiple Strategies 126
3.5 Antitrust and Collusion 135
3.6 State-Aids and Strategic Export Promotion 137
3.7 Privatizations 140
3.8 Conclusions 141
3.9 Appendix 142
4. Dynamic Competition and Endogenous Entry 147
4.1 A Simple Patent Race with Contractual Costs of R& D
4.2 Dynamic Competition for the Market 158
4.3 Sequential Innovations 167
4.4 Competition in the Market and Competition for the Market 175
4.5 Conclusions 178
4.6 Appendix 181
5. Antitrust and Abuse of Dominance 186
5.1 The Traditional Approaches to Abuse of Dominance 189
5.2 The Theory of Market Leaders and Endogenous Entry 193
5.3 A Digression on IPRs Protection 204
5.4 Reforming Antitrust 210
5.5 Conclusions 219
6. Microsoft Economics 222
6.1 The Software Market 223
6.2 The Antitrust Cases 233
6.3 Is Microsoft a Monopolist? 238
6.4 Bundling 245
6.5 Intellectual Property Rights 250
6.6 Conclusions 255
7. Epilogue 257
7.1 Empirical Predictions of the Theory of Market Leaders 257
7.2 Implications for Business Administration 266
7.3 Implications for Economic Theory 266
7.4 Conclusions 269
8. References 270
Index 288