Security and Privacy in Cyber-Physical Systems

HOUBING SONG, PhD is an assistant professor in the Department of Electrical, Computer, Software, and Systems Engineering at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Daytona Beach, Florida, and the Director of the Security and Optimization for Networked Globe Laboratory (SONG Lab, www.SONGLab.us). GLENN A. FINK, PhD is a cyber security researcher with the National Security Directorate, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. He was the lead inventor of PNNL's Digital Ants technology. SABINA JESCHKE, Dr. rer. nat. is a professor in the Department of Mechanical Engineering, RWTH Aachen University, Germany, and Head of the Cybernetics Lab IMA/ZLW & IfU.

List of Contributors xvii

Foreword xxiii

Preface xxv

Acknowledgments xxix

1 Overview of Security and Privacy in Cyber-Physical Systems 1
Glenn A. Fink, ThomasW. Edgar, Theora R. Rice, Douglas G. MacDonald and Cary E. Crawford

1.1 Introduction 1

1.2 Defining Security and Privacy 1

1.2.1 Cybersecurity and Privacy 2

1.2.2 Physical Security and Privacy 3

1.3 Defining Cyber-Physical Systems 4

1.3.1 Infrastructural CPSs 5

1.3.1.1 Example: Electric Power 5

1.3.2 Personal CPSs 5

1.3.2.1 Example: Smart Appliances 6

1.3.3 Security and Privacy in CPSs 6

1.4 Examples of Security and Privacy in Action 7

1.4.1 Security in Cyber-Physical Systems 7

1.4.1.1 Protecting Critical Infrastructure from Blended Threat 8

1.4.1.2 Cyber-Physical Terrorism 8

1.4.1.3 Smart Car Hacking 9

1.4.1.4 Port Attack 10

1.4.2 Privacy in Cyber-Physical Systems 11

1.4.2.1 Wearables 11

1.4.2.2 Appliances 12

1.4.2.3 Motivating Sharing 12

1.4.3 Blending Information and Physical Security and Privacy 12

1.5 Approaches to Secure Cyber-Physical Systems 14

1.5.1 Least Privilege 14

1.5.2 Need-to-Know 15

1.5.3 Segmentation 15

1.5.4 Defensive Dimensionality 16

1.5.4.1 Defense-in-Depth 16

1.5.4.2 Defense-in-Breadth 16

1.5.5 User-Configurable Data Collection/Logging 17

1.5.6 Pattern Obfuscation 17

1.5.7 End-to-End Security 17

1.5.8 Tamper Detection/Security 18

1.6 Ongoing Security and Privacy Challenges for CPSs 18

1.6.1 Complexity of Privacy Regulations 18

1.6.2 Managing and Incorporating Legacy Systems 19

1.6.3 Distributed Identity and Authentication Management 20

1.6.4 Modeling Distributed CPSs 20

1.7 Conclusion 21

References 21

2 Network Security and Privacy for Cyber-Physical Systems 25
Martin Henze, Jens Hiller, René Hummen, Roman Matzutt, KlausWehrle andJan H. Ziegeldorf

2.1 Introduction 25

2.2 Security and Privacy Issues in CPSs 26

2.2.1 CPS Reference Model 27

2.2.1.1 Device Level 27

2.2.1.2 Control/Enterprise Level 27

2.2.1.3 Cloud Level 28

2.2.2 CPS Evolution 28

2.2.3 Security and PrivacyThreats in CPSs 30

2.3 Local Network Security for CPSs 31

2.3.1 Secure Device Bootstrapping 32

2.3.1.1 Initial Key Exchange 33

2.3.1.2 Device Life Cycle 33

2.3.2 Secure Local Communication 34

2.3.2.1 Physical Layer 34

2.3.2.2 Medium Access 34

2.3.2.3 Network Layer 35

2.3.2.4 Secure Local Forwarding for Internet-Connected CPSs 35

2.4 Internet-Wide Secure Communication 36

2.4.1 Security Challenges for Internet-Connected CPS 37

2.4.2 Tailoring End-to-End Security to CPS 38

2.4.3 Handling Resource Heterogeneity 39

2.4.3.1 Reasonable Retransmission Mechanisms 39

2.4.3.2 Denial-of-Service Protection 40

2.5 Security and Privacy for Cloud-Interconnected CPSs 41

2.5.1 Securely Storing CPS Data in the Cloud 42

2.5.1.1 Protection of CPS Data 43

2.5.1.2 Access Control 43

2.5.2 Securely Processing CPS Data in the Cloud 44

2.5.3 Privacy for Cloud-Based CPSs 45

2.6 Summary 46

2.7 Conclusion and Outlook 47

Acknowledgments 48

References 48

3 Tutorial on Information Theoretic Metrics Quantifying Privacy in Cyber-Physical Systems 57
Guido Dartmann, Mehmet Ö. Demir, Hendrik Laux, Volker Lücken, Naim Bajcinca, Gunes K. Kurt, Gerd Ascheid andMartina Ziefle

3.1 Social Perspective and Motivation 57

3.1.1 Motivation 59

3.1.2 Scenario 60

3.2 Information Theoretic Privacy Measures 62

3.2.1 Information Theoretic Foundations 62

3.2.2 Surprise and Specific Information 63

3.3 Privacy Models and Protection 64

3.3.1 k-Anonymity 65

3.4 Smart City Scenario: System Perspective 67

3.4.1 Attack without Anonymization 68

3.4.2 Attack with Anonymization of the ZIP 70

3.4.3 Attack with Anonymization of the Bluetooth ID 71

3.5 Conclusion and Outlook 71

Appendix A Derivation of the Mutual Information Based on the KLD 72

Appendix B Derivation of the Mutual Information In Terms of Entropy 73

Appendix C Derivation of the Mutual Information Conditioned onx 73

Appendix D Proof of Corollary 3.1 74

References 74

4 Cyber-Physical Systems and National Security Concerns 77
Jeff Kosseff

4.1 Introduction 77

4.2 National Security Concerns Arising from Cyber-Physical Systems 79

4.2.1 Stuxnet 80

4.2.2 German Steel Mill 81

4.2.3 Future Attacks 82

4.3 National Security Implications of Attacks on Cyber-Physical Systems 82

4.3.1 Was the Cyber-Attack a “Use of Force” That Violates International Law? 83

4.3.2 If the AttackWas a Use of Force,Was That Force Attributable to a State? 86

4.3.3 Did the Use of Force Constitute an “Armed Attack” That Entitles the Target to Self-Defense? 87

4.3.4 If theUse of ForceWas an ArmedAttack, What Types of Self-Defense Are Justified? 88

4.4 Conclusion 89

References 90

5 Legal Considerations of Cyber-Physical Systems and the Internet of Things 93
Alan C. Rither and Christopher M. Hoxie

5.1 Introduction 93

5.2 Privacy and Technology in Recent History 94

5.3 The Current State of Privacy Law 96

5.3.1 Privacy 98

5.3.2 Legal Background 98

5.3.3 Safety 99

5.3.4 Regulatory 100

5.3.4.1 Executive Branch Agencies 101

5.3.4.2 The Federal Trade Commission 101

5.3.4.3 The Federal Communications Commission 105

5.3.4.4 National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration 106

5.3.4.5 Food and Drug Administration 108

5.3.4.6 Federal Aviation Administration 109

5.4 Meeting Future Challenges 111

References 113

6 Key Management in CPSs 117
YongWang and Jason Nikolai

6.1 Introduction 117

6.2 Key Management Security Goals and Threat Model 117

6.2.1 CPS Architecture 118

6.2.2 Threats and Attacks 119

6.2.3 Security Goals 120

6.3 CPS Key Management Design Principles 121

6.3.1 Heterogeneity 122

6.3.2 Real-Time Availability 122

6.3.3 Resilience to Attacks 123

6.3.4 Interoperability 123

6.3.5 Survivability 123

6.4 CPS Key Management 124

6.4.1 Dynamic versus Static 124

6.4.2 Public Key versus Symmetric Key 125

6.4.2.1 Public Key Cryptography 125

6.4.2.2 Symmetric Key Cryptography 127

6.4.3 Centralized versus Distributed 128

6.4.4 Deterministic versus Probabilistic 129

6.4.5 Standard versus Proprietary 130

6.4.6 Key Distribution versus Key Revocation 131

6.4.7 Key Management for SCADA Systems 131

6.5 CPS Key Management Challenges and Open Research Issues 132

6.6 Summary 133

References 133

7 Secure Registration and Remote Attestation of IoT Devices Joining the Cloud: The Stack4Things Case of Study 137
Antonio Celesti,Maria Fazio, Francesco Longo, Giovanni Merlino and Antonio Puliafito

7.1 Introduction 137

7.2 Background 138

7.2.1 Cloud Integration with IoT 139

7.2.2 Security and Privacy in Cloud and IoT 139

7.2.3 Technologies 140

7.2.3.1 Hardware 140

7.2.3.2 Web Connectivity 141

7.2.3.3 Cloud 141

7.3 Reference Scenario and Motivation 142

7.4 Stack4Things Architecture 143

7.4.1 Board Side 144

7.4.2 Cloud-Side – Control and Actuation 145

7.4.3 Cloud-Side – Sensing Data Collection 146

7.5 Capabilities for Making IoT Devices Secure Over the Cloud 147

7.5.1 Trusted Computing 147

7.5.2 Security Keys, Cryptographic Algorithms, and Hidden IDs 148

7.5.3 Arduino YUN Security Extensions 149

7.6 Adding Security Capabilities to Stack4Things 149

7.6.1 Board-Side Security Extension 149

7.6.2 Cloud-Side Security Extension 150

7.6.3 Security Services in Stack4Things 150

7.6.3.1 Secure Registration of IoT Devices Joining the Cloud 151

7.6.3.2 Remote Attestation of IoT Devices 152

7.7 Conclusion 152

References 153

8 Context Awareness for Adaptive Access Control Management in IoT Environments 157
Paolo Bellavista and Rebecca Montanari

8.1 Introduction 157

8.2 Security Challenges in IoT Environments 158

8.2.1 Heterogeneity and Resource Constraints 158

8.2.2 IoT Size and Dynamicity 160

8.3 Surveying Access Control Models and Solutions for IoT 160

8.3.1 Novel Access Control Requirements 160

8.3.2 Access Control Models for the IoT 162

8.3.3 State-of-the-Art Access Control Solutions 164

8.4 Access Control Adaptation:Motivations and Design Guidelines 165

8.4.1 Semantic Context-Aware Policies for Access Control Adaptation 166

8.4.2 Adaptation Enforcement Issues 167

8.5 Our Adaptive Context-Aware Access Control Solution for Smart

8.5.1 The Proteus Model 168

8.5.2 Adapting the General Proteus Model for the IoT 170

8.5.2.1 The Proteus Architecture for the IoT 172

8.5.2.2 Implementation and Deployment Issues 173

8.6 Open Technical Challenges and Concluding Remarks 174

References 176

9 Data Privacy Issues in Distributed Security Monitoring Systems 179
Jeffery A. Mauth and DavidW. Archer

9.1 Information Security in Distributed Data Collection Systems 179

9.2 Technical Approaches for Assuring Information Security 181

9.2.1 Trading Security for Cost 182

9.2.2 Confidentiality: Keeping Data Private 182

9.2.3 Integrity: Preventing Data Tampering and Repudiation 186

9.2.4 Minimality: Reducing Data Attack Surfaces 188

9.2.5 Anonymity: Separating Owner from Data 188

9.2.6 Authentication: Verifying User Privileges for Access to Data 189

9.3 Approaches for Building Trust in Data Collection Systems 190

9.3.1 Transparency 190

9.3.2 Data Ownership and Usage Policies 191

9.3.3 Data Security Controls 191

9.3.4 Data Retention and Destruction Policies 192

9.3.5 Managing Data-loss Liability 192

9.3.6 Privacy Policies and Consent 192

9.4 Conclusion 193

References 193

10 Privacy Protection for Cloud-Based Robotic Networks 195
Hajoon Ko, Sye L. Keoh and Jiong Jin

10.1 Introduction 195

10.2 Cloud Robot Network: Use Case, Challenges, and Security Requirements 197

10.2.1 Use Case 197

10.2.2 SecurityThreats and Challenges 199

10.2.3 Security Requirements 200

10.3 Establishment of Cloud Robot Networks 200

10.3.1 Cloud Robot Network as a Community 200

10.3.2 A Policy-Based Establishment of Cloud Robot Networks 201

10.3.3 Doctrine: A Community Specification 201

10.3.3.1 Attribute Types and User-Attribute Assignment (UAA) Policies 203

10.3.3.2 Authorization and Obligation Policies 203

10.3.3.3 Constraints Specification 205

10.3.3.4 Trusted Key Specification 206

10.3.3.5 Preferences Specification 206

10.3.3.6 Authentication in Cloud Robot Community 207

10.3.3.7 Service Access Control 207

10.4 Communication Security 207

10.4.1 Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) 207

10.4.2 Preliminaries 208

10.4.3 Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) Scheme 208

10.4.4 Revocation Based on Shamir’s Secret Sharing 209

10.4.5 Cloud Robot Community’s CP-ABE Key Revocation 209

10.4.6 Integration of CP-ABE and Robot Community Architecture 210

10.5 Security Management of Cloud Robot Networks 212

10.5.1 Bootstrapping (Establishing) a Cloud Robot Community 212

10.5.2 Joining the Community 214

10.5.3 Leaving a Community 215

10.5.4 Service Access Control 216

10.6 RelatedWork 217

10.7 Conclusion 219

References 220

11 Toward Network Coding for Cyber-Physical Systems: Security Challenges and Applications 223
Pouya Ostovari and JieWu

11.1 Introduction 223

11.2 Background on Network Coding and Its Applications 225

11.2.1 Background and Preliminaries 225

11.2.2 Network Coding Applications 226

11.2.2.1 Throughput/Capacity Enhancement 226

11.2.2.2 Robustness Enhancement 227

11.2.2.3 Protocol Simplification 228

11.2.2.4 Network Tomography 228

11.2.2.5 Security 229

11.2.3 Network Coding Classification 229

11.2.3.1 Stateless Network Coding Protocols 229

11.2.3.2 State-Aware Network Coding Protocols 229

11.3 Security Challenges 230

11.3.1 Byzantine Attack 230

11.3.2 Pollution Attack 230

11.3.3 Traffic Analysis 230

11.3.4 Eavesdropping Attack 231

11.3.5 Classification of the Attacks 232

11.3.5.1 Passive versus Active 232

11.3.5.2 External versus Internal 232

11.3.5.3 Effect of Network Coding 232

11.4 Secure Network Coding 233

11.4.1 Defense against Byzantine and Pollution Attack 233

11.4.2 Defense against Traffic Analysis 234

11.5 Applications of Network Coding in Providing Security 234

11.5.1 Eavesdropping Attack 234

11.5.1.1 Secure Data Transmission 234

11.5.1.2 Secure Data Storage 236

11.5.2 Secret Key Exchange 237

11.6 Conclusion 238

Acknowledgment 239

References 239

12 Lightweight Crypto and Security 243
Lo’ai A. Tawalbeh and Hala Tawalbeh

12.1 Introduction 243

12.1.1 Cyber-Physical Systems CPSs 243

12.1.2 Security and Privacy 243

12.1.3 Lightweight Cryptography (LWC) 243

12.1.4 Chapter Organization 244

12.2 Cyber-Physical Systems 244

12.3 Security and Privacy in Cyber-Physical Systems 245

12.4 Lightweight Cryptography Implementations for Security and Privacy in

CPSs 247

12.4.1 Introduction 247

12.4.2 Why Is Lightweight Cryptography Important? 249

12.4.3 Lightweight Symmetric and Asymmetric Ciphers Implementations 250

12.4.3.1 Hardware Implementations of Symmetric Ciphers 251

12.4.3.2 Software Implementations of Symmetric Ciphers 253

12.4.3.3 Hardware Implementations of Asymmetric Ciphers 254

12.4.3.4 Software Implementations of Asymmetric Ciphers 255

12.4.3.5 Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA) 256

12.5 Opportunities and Challenges 257

12.6 Conclusion 258

Acknowledgments 259

References 259

13 Cyber-Physical Vulnerabilities ofWireless Sensor Networks in Smart Cities 263
Md. Mahmud Hasan and Hussein T. Mouftah

13.1 Introduction 263

13.1.1 The Smart City Concept and Components 263

13.2 WSN Applications in Smart Cities 265

13.2.1 Smart Home 265

13.2.2 Smart Grid Applications 267

13.2.2.1 Substation Monitoring 267

13.2.3 Intelligent Transport System Applications 268

13.2.3.1 Roadside Unit 268

13.2.3.2 Vehicular Sensor Network 269

13.2.3.3 Intelligent Sensor Network 269

13.2.4 Real-Time Monitoring and Safety Alert 270

13.3 Cyber-Physical Vulnerabilities 270

13.3.1 Possible Attacks 271

13.3.2 Impacts on Smart City Lives 272

13.3.2.1 Service Interruption 272

13.3.2.2 Damage to Property 273

13.3.2.3 Damage to Life 273

13.3.2.4 Privacy Infiltration 274

13.4 Solution Approaches 274

13.4.1 Cryptography 274

13.4.2 Intrusion Detection System 276

13.4.3 Watchdog System 277

13.4.4 GameTheoretic Deployment 277

13.4.5 Managed Security 277

13.4.6 Physical Security Measures 278

13.5 Conclusion 278

Acknowledgment 278

References 279

14 Detecting Data Integrity Attacks in Smart Grid 281
Linqiang Ge,Wei Yu, Paul Moulema, Guobin Xu, David Griffith and Nada Golmie

14.1 Introduction 281

14.2 Literature Review 283

14.3 Network andThreat Models 285

14.3.1 Network Model 285

14.3.2 Threat Model 286

14.4 Our Approach 287

14.4.1 Overview 287

14.4.2 Detection Schemes 289

14.4.2.1 Statistical Anomaly-Based Detection 289

14.4.2.2 Machine Learning-Based Detection 290

14.4.2.3 Sequential Hypothesis Testing-Based Detection 291

14.5 Performance Evaluation 292

14.5.1 Evaluation Setup 292

14.5.2 Evaluation Results 294

14.6 Extension 297

14.7 Conclusion 298

References 298

15 Data Security and Privacy in Cyber-Physical Systems for Healthcare 305
Aida Cauševic, Hossein Fotouhi and Kristina Lundqvist

15.1 Introduction 305

15.2 Medical Cyber-Physical Systems 306

15.2.1 Communication withinWBANs 307

15.2.1.1 Network Topology 307

15.2.1.2 Interference inWBANs 308

15.2.1.3 Challenges with LPWNs inWBANs 308

15.2.1.4 Feedback Control inWBANs 308

15.2.1.5 Radio Technologies 309

15.2.2 ExistingWBAN-Based Health Monitoring Systems 310

15.3 Data Security and Privacy Issues and Challenges inWBANs 312

15.3.1 Data Security and PrivacyThreats and Attacks 314

15.4 Existing Security and Privacy Solutions inWBAN 314

15.4.1 Academic Contributions 315

15.4.1.1 Biometric Solutions 315

15.4.1.2 Cryptographic Solutions 316

15.4.1.3 Solutions on ImplantableMedical Devices 318

15.4.2 Existing Commercial Solutions 319

15.5 Conclusion 320

References 320

16 Cyber Security of Smart Buildings 327
SteffenWendzel, Jernej Tonejc, Jaspreet Kaur and Alexandra Kobekova

16.1 What Is a Smart Building? 327

16.1.1 Definition of the Term 327

16.1.2 The Design and the Relevant Components of a Smart Building 328

16.1.3 Historical Development of Building Automation Systems 330

16.1.4 The Role of Smart Buildings in Smart Cities 330

16.1.5 Known Cases of Attacks on Smart Buildings 331

16.2 Communication Protocols for Smart Buildings 332

16.2.1 KNX/EIB 333

16.2.2 BACnet 335

16.2.3 ZigBee 336

16.2.4 EnOcean 338

16.2.5 Other Protocols 339

16.2.6 Interoperability and Interconnectivity 339

16.3 Attacks 340

16.3.1 How Can Buildings Be Attacked? 340

16.3.2 Implications for the Privacy of Inhabitants and Users 340

16.3.3 Reasons for Insecure Buildings 341

16.4 Solutions to Protect Smart Buildings 342

16.4.1 Raising Security Awareness and Developing Security Know-How 342

16.4.2 Physical Access Control 343

16.4.3 Hardening Automation Systems 343

16.4.3.1 Secure Coding 343

16.4.3.2 Operating System Hardening 343

16.4.3.3 Patching 344

16.4.4 Network-Level Protection 344

16.4.4.1 Firewalls 345

16.4.4.2 Monitoring and Intrusion Detection Systems 345

16.4.4.3 Separation of Networks 345

16.4.5 Responsibility Matrix 345

16.5 Recent Trends in Smart Building Security Research 346

16.5.1 Visualization 346

16.5.2 Network Security 346

16.5.2.1 Traffic Normalization 346

16.5.2.2 Anomaly Detection 346

16.5.2.3 Novel Fuzzing Approaches 347

16.6 Conclusion and Outlook 347

References 348

17 The Internet of Postal Things: Making the Postal Infrastructure Smarter 353
Paola Piscioneri, Jessica Raines and Jean Philippe Ducasse

17.1 Introduction 353

17.2 Scoping the Internet of PostalThings 354

17.2.1 The Rationale for an Internet of PostalThings 354

17.2.1.1 A Vast Infrastructure 354

17.2.1.2 Trust as a Critical Brand Attribute 355

17.2.1.3 Operational Experience in Data Collection and Analytics 356

17.2.1.4 Customer Demand for Information 356

17.2.2 Adjusting to a New Business Environment 356

17.2.2.1 Shifting from Unconnected to “Smart” Products and Services 357

17.2.2.2 Shifting from Competing on Price to Competing on Overall Value 357

17.2.2.3 Shifting from Industries to Ecosystems 357

17.2.2.4 Shifting fromWorkforce Replacement to Human-Centered Automation 357

17.3 Identifying Internet of Postal Things Applications 358

17.3.1 Transportation and Logistics 358

17.3.1.1 Predictive Maintenance 359

17.3.1.2 Fuel Management 359

17.3.1.3 Usage-Based Insurance 360

17.3.1.4 Driverless Vehicles 360

17.3.1.5 Load Optimization 360

17.3.1.6 Real-Time Dynamic Routing 360

17.3.1.7 Collaborative Last Mile Logistics 361

17.3.2 Enhanced Mail and Parcel Services: The Connected Mailbox 361

17.3.2.1 Concept and Benefits 362

17.3.2.2 The Smart Mailbox as a Potential Source of New Revenue 363

17.3.3 The Internet ofThings in Postal Buildings 364

17.3.3.1 Optimizing Energy Costs 364

17.3.3.2 The Smarter Post Office 365

17.3.4 Neighborhood Services 365

17.3.4.1 Smart Cities Need Local Partners 365

17.3.4.2 Carriers as Neighborhood Logistics Managers 366

17.3.5 Summarizing the Dollar Value of IoPT Applications 367

17.4 The Future of IoPT 367

17.4.1 IoPT Development Stages 367

17.4.2 Implementation Challenges 368

17.4.3 Building a Successful Platform Strategy 371

17.5 Conclusion 371

References 372

18 Security and Privacy Issues in the Internet of Cows 375
Amber Adams-Progar, Glenn A. Fink, ElyWalker and Don Llewellyn

18.1 Precision Livestock Farming 375

18.1.1 Impact on Humans 376

18.1.1.1 Labor andWorkforce Effects 377

18.1.1.2 Food Quality and Provenance 377

18.1.1.3 Transparency and Remote Management 378

18.1.2 Impact on Animals 379

18.1.2.1 Estrus Monitoring 379

18.1.2.2 Rumen Health 380

18.1.2.3 Other Bovine Health Conditions 381

18.1.3 Impact on the Environment 382

18.1.4 Future Directions for IoT Solutions 383

18.2 Security and Privacy of IoT in Agriculture 384

18.2.1 Cyber-Physical System Vulnerabilities 385

18.2.2 Threat Models 386

18.2.2.1 Threat: Misuse of Video Data 386

18.2.2.2 Threat: Misuse of Research Data 387

18.2.2.3 Threat: Misuse of Provenance Data 387

18.2.2.4 Threat: Data Leakage via Leased Equipment and Software 388

18.2.2.5 Threat: Political Action and Terrorism 389

18.2.3 Recommendations for IoT Security and Privacy in Agriculture 390

18.2.3.1 Data Confidentiality 391

18.2.3.2 Data Integrity 393

18.2.3.3 System Availability 393

18.2.3.4 System Safety 393

18.3 Conclusion 395

References 395

19 Admission Control-Based Load Protection in the Smart Grid 399
Paul Moulema, SriharshaMallapuram,Wei Yu, David Griffith, Nada Golmie and David Su

19.1 Introduction 399

19.2 RelatedWork 401

19.3 Our Approach 402

19.3.1 Load Admission Control 403

19.3.2 Load Shedding Techniques 404

19.3.2.1 Load-Size-Based Shedding – Smallest Load First: 405

19.3.2.2 Load-Size-Based Shedding – Largest Load First: 406

19.3.2.3 Priority-Based Load Shedding: 407

19.3.2.4 Fair Priority-Based Load Shedding: 408

19.3.3 Simulation Scenarios 410

19.4 Performance Evaluation 411

19.4.1 Scenario 1: Normal Operation 411

19.4.2 Scenario 2: Brutal Admission Control 413

19.4.3 Scenario 3: Load-Size-Based Admission Control 413

19.4.4 Scenario 4: Priority-Based Admission Control 416

19.4.5 Scenario 5: Fair Priority-Based Admission Control 417

19.5 Conclusion 419

References 419

Editor Biographies 423

Index 427