Elgar Encyclopedia on the Economics of Competition, Regulation and Antitrust

Edited by Michael D. Noel, Professor, Department of Economics, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, USA

Contents:
Preface xi
PART I COMPETITION THEORY
1 Auction theory 2
Daniel R. Vincent
2 Buyer cartels 8
Brianna L. Alderman and Roger D. Blair
3 Collusion and supergames 12
Michael D. Noel and Freddie Papazyan
4 Contracting with moral hazard 24
George Georgiadis
5 Demand estimation 38
Steven Berry
6 Drip pricing 43
Andrew Rhodes
7 False advertising 48
Andrew Rhodes
8 Information 52
Michael R. Baye and Jeffrey T. Prince
9 Innovation 58
Kevin A. Bryan
10 Insurance competition under asymmetric information 64
Pierre-André Chiappori
11 Machine learning 68
Syed Muhammad Ishraque Osman
12 Market failure 76
Van Kolpin and Connor Thomas Wiegand
13 Monopoly 81
Bret Dickey and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
14 Oligopoly 85
Lynne Pepall and Dan Richards
15 Price discrimination 90
Jiawei Chen and Matthew Shum
16 Productivity 95
Jan De Loecker and Chad Syverson
17 Two-sided platforms 100
Paul Belleflamme and Johannes Johnen
18 Vertical integration and mergers 109
Luke Froeb and Michael Vita
PART II ANTITRUST LAW
19 Antitrust law in the U.S. 115
Layne E. Kruse and Eliot F. Turner
20 Antitrust law in the European Union 122
Alison Jones
PART III ANTITRUST ISSUES
21 Concentration 132
Christopher T. Taylor
22 Exclusive contracts 136
Giacomo Calzolari and Frank Verboven
23 Franchising 143
Francine Lafontaine and Margaret E. Slade
24 Market definition 149
Lawrence J. White
25 Mergers: coordinated effects 155
Elisa Greene Morales and Timo Klein
26 Mergers: countervailing effects 164
Nathan H. Miller and Gloria Sheu
27 Mergers: unilateral effects 169
Michael D. Noel
28 Monopolization 181
Bret Dickey and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
29 Most Favoured Nation and parity clauses 186
Amelia Fletcher
30 Patents 191
Cesare Righi and Valerio Sterzi
31 Pay-for-delay patent cases 200
Kristopher Hult
32 Price fixing and conspiracy 205
Michael D. Noel
33 Resale price maintenance 219
Kenneth G. Elzinga and John P. Bigelow
34 Robinson-Patman Act and price discrimination 225
Christina DePasquale
35 Standard Setting Organizations 231
Timothy Simcoe
36 Tying and bundling 237
Jorge Padilla
37 Vertical Restraints 243
Gregory J. Werden
PART IV REGULATION THEORY
38 Regulation categories 249
Lawrence J. White
39 Regulation methods 257
Mark A. Jamison
40 Regulatory goals and implementation 263
David E. M. Sappington
PART V INDUSTRY CASE STUDIES IN COMPETITION, REGULATION, AND ANTITRUST
41 Agricultural cooperatives and marketing orders 271
John M. Crespi and Richard J. Sexton
42 Airlines 280
J. Forbes
43 Automobiles and CAFE standards 285
Misak Avetisyan
44 Banking and finance 289
Robert Clark and Jean-François Houde
45 Black markets 298
Gregory DeAngelo, Margaret Kohl and Bianca Nigri
46 Electricity markets 306
David P. Brown and Andrew Eckert
47 Emission regulations 313
Misak Avetisyan
48 Financial securities 317
Dan Bergstresser
49 Health insurance markets 321
Michael A. Morrisey
50 Hospital and physician markets 328
Michael A. Morrisey
51 Housing and real estate markets 334
Thomas Davidoff
52 Medicare advantage 342
Keaton Miller
53 Mobile networks and broadband 349
Thomas W. Hazlett
54 Online competition 359
Mark A. Jamison
55 Pharmaceuticals 365
Luca Maini
56 Platform businesses 372
David S. Evans
57 Railroad freight 382
Russell Pittman
58 Retail sector 386
Emek Basker
59 Technology and antitrust: lessons from Google, Microsoft, and ATT 390
Shane Greenstein
60 Telephone services 399
Andrew Kearns and Mo Xiao
61 Video distribution 409
Marion McCutcheon and Amanda D. Lotz
Index 418