Economics of Tort Law

Edited by Alan O. Sykes, Professor of Law and Warren Christopher Professor in the Practice of International Law and Diplomacy, Stanford University, US

Contents:

Volume I

Acknowledgements

Introduction Alan O. Sykes

PART ILIABILITY RULES, PROPERTY RULES, REGULATION AND THE COASE THEOREM
1. R.H. Coase (1960), ‘The Problem of Social Cost’
2. Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed (1972), ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral’
3. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell (1996), ‘Property Rules versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis’
4. Steven Shavell (1984), ‘Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety’

PART IINEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY
5. Richard A. Posner (1972), ‘A Theory of Negligence’
6. Richard A. Epstein (1973), ‘A Theory of Strict Liability’
7. John Prather Brown (1973), ‘Toward an Economic Theory of Liability’
8. Steven Shavell (1980), ‘Strict Liability versus Negligence’
9. A. Mitchell Polinsky (1980), ‘Strict Liability vs. Negligence in a Market Setting’
10. Mark F. Grady (1983), ‘A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence’
11. John E. Calfee and Richard Craswell (1984), ‘Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards’

PART IIICAUSATION
12. Guido Calabresi (1975), ‘Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr.’
13. Steven Shavell (1980), ‘An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts’
14. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1983), ‘Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach’
15. Marcel Kahan (1989), ‘Causation and Incentives to Take Care under the Negligence Rule’

PART IVCOMPENSATORY DAMAGES
16. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (1988), ‘The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation for the Level of Liability’
17. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Yeon-Koo Che (1991), ‘Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation’,
18. W. Kip Viscusi (2000), ’The Value of Life in Legal Contexts: Survey and Critique’

Name Index


Volume II

Acknowledgements

An introduction by the editor to both volumes appears in Volume I

PART IPUNITIVE DAMAGES AND THE MULTIPLIER PRINCIPLE
1. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell (1998), ‘Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis’
2. Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman and David Schkade (1998), ‘Assessing Punitive Damages (With Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law)’
3. Richard Craswell (1999), ‘Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier Principle and Its Alternatives’
4. Keith N. Hylton and Thomas J. Miceli (2005), ‘Should Tort Damages be Multiplied?’

PART IIVICARIOUS LIABILITY
5. Lewis A. Kornhauser (1982), ‘An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise and Personal Liability for Accidents’
6. Alan O. Sykes (1984), ‘The Economics of Vicarious Liability’
7. Alan O. Sykes (1988), ‘The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines’

PART IIIAFFIRMATIVE DUTIES
8. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1978), ‘Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism’
9. Saul Levmore (1986), ‘Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure of the Law of Affirmative Obligations’

PART IVMISCELLANEOUS TOPICS
10. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1980), ‘Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis’
11. Steven Shavell (1982), ‘On Liability and Insurance’
12. Patricia M. Danzon (1985), ‘Liability and Liability Insurance for Medical Malpractice’
14. W. Bishop (1982), ‘Economic Loss in Tort’
15. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1981), ‘An Economic Theory of Intentional Torts’
16. Patricia Munch Danzon (1983), ‘Contingent Fees for Personal Injury Litigation’

Name Index