Licensing Standard Essential Patents

Igor Nikolic is Robert Schuman Fellow at the European University Institute, Italy, and Senior Fellow at the Centre for Law, Economics and Society, University College London, UK.

I. Setting the Context
II. Structure
PART I
THE STANDARD-DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT
1. Standards, Standard-Development Organisations and Standard Essential Patents
I. Standards
A. Technical Interoperability Standards
B. Classification of Standards
i. Standards Based on their Source
a. De Facto Standards
b. Collaborative Standards
c. Governmental Standards
ii. Open and Closed Standards
II. Standard Development Organisations
A. Types of SDOs
B. Membership
C. How SDOs Develop Standards
III. Standard Essential Patents
A. SEPs in IPR Policies of SDOs
i. Disclosure Rules
ii. Licensing Rules
B. The Meaning of Essentiality
C. The Problem of Over-Disclosure
IV. Conclusion

2. The Dynamics of Standard Essential Patent Licensing: Patent Holdup, Holdout and Royalty Stacking
I. Industry Convergences and Changing Market Dynamics
II. Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking
A. Patent Holdup
B. Royalty Stacking
C. The Influence of Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Theories
III. Criticism of Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Theories
A. The Lack of Empirical Evidence of Systematic Negative Effects
B. The Misunderstanding of the Standardisation Process and Legal Licensing Framework
IV. Patent Holdout
V. Conclusion

PART II
THE MEANING AND CONTENT OF A FRAND LICENCE
3. The Nature of a FRAND Commitment
I. The Principles and the Text of a FRAND Commitment
II. The Enforceability of a FRAND Commitment
A. Contract Law
i. Can SDO Non-Members Rely on a FRAND Contract?
ii. Is a FRAND Commitment Sufficiently Clear to be an Enforceable Contract
iii. Transferability of a FRAND Commitment
iv. Not All Jurisdictions Recognise Third-Party Beneficiary Rights
v. SDOs Could Clarify the Contractual Nature of a FRAND Commitment
B. Competition Law
i. EU Competition Law and Breach of FRAND Commitments
ii. US Antitrust Law and Breach of FRAND Commitments
iii. The Role of Competition Law in the SEP Context
C. Alternative Theories on the Enforceability of FRAND Commitments
III. Conclusion

4. FRAND Royalty
I. The Principles of FRAND Royalty
A. The Value of the Technology Itself (the Ex Ante Incremental Value Approach)
i. Reception in Practice
ii. Criticism of the Ex Ante Incremental Value Approach
a. Misunderstanding the Standard-Development Process
b. Depreciating the Value of SEPs
c. Not Used in Real-World Commercial Transactions
d. Inapplicability in Practice
B. Sharing the Value of Standardisation
II. Calculating FRAND Royalties in Practice
A. Comparable Licences
i. Application in Practice
B. Top-Down Approach
i. Application in Practice
C. Other Approaches
III. Conclusion

5. The Non-Discrimination Requirement of a FRAND Commitment
I. Positive and Negative Aspects of Price Discrimination in Standard Essential Patent Licensing
II. The Non-Discrimination Requirement in the Text of a FRAND Commitment
III. No Requirement to Apply Uniform Terms to All Licensees
IV. Interpretations of the Non-Discrimination Requirement of a FRAND Commitment
A. Prohibition of Discrimination between Different Levels of the Production Chain
B. Prohibiting Price Discrimination of Vertically Integrated SEP Holders against Downstream Competitors
C. Prohibiting Discrimination against Similarly Situated Licensees
i. Which Licensees are Similarly Situated?
ii. When is Dissimilar Treatment Discriminatory?
iii. What are the Remedies for Discrimination?
V. The Application of the Non-Discrimination Requirement of a FRAND Commitment
VI. Confidentiality Agreements and Disclosure of Licences
VII. Conclusion

6. FRAND Royalty Base
I. Introduction: The End-Product or Component?
II. The Appropriate FRAND Royalty Base
III. The Legal Requirement to Use a Particular Royalty Base
A. Origins and Evolution of the SSPPU Theory
i. US Patent Damages System and the Emergence of the SSPPU Theory
ii. Reception and Expansion of the SSPPU Doctrine by the Federal Circuit
iii. Clarification and Backtracking of the SSPPU Doctrine by the Federal Circuit
iv. Jury Bias as a Reason for the Introduction of the SSPPU
B. Conclusion
IV. The Royalty Base in Standard Essential Patent Litigation
V. Conclusion

7. FRAND and Value Chain Licensing
I. The Value Chain Licensing Debate
II. Patent Law and Value Chain Licensing
III. FRAND Commitments and Value Chain Licensing
IV. Competition Law and Value Chain Licensing
A. Refusal to License and EU Competition Law
B. Article 101 TFEU and the Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines
C. Refusal to License and US Antitrust Law
V. Policy Outlook for the Internet of Things
VI. Conclusion

8. Remedies
I. Injunctions
A. Principles of Equity (US Courts)
B. Public Policy (International Trade Commission)
C. Unfair Competition (Federal Trade Commission)
D. Competition Law (EU)
i. The Interpretation of Huawei v ZTE by National Courts
E. Conclusion
II. Global or Territorial Scope of a FRAND Licence?
III. Antisuit Injunctions
IV. Past Damages
V. Procedural Remedies to Facilitate Patent Licensing
A. A FRAND Trial First
B. Interim Payments
VI. Conclusion

PART III
STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENT LICENSING IN THE INTERNET OF THINGS
9. Standard Essential Patent Licensing in the Internet of Things
I. Challenges of FRAND Licensing in the Internet of Things
II. Current Proposals for Improving the Standard Essential Patent Licensing Framework
A. Transparency of the SEP Landscape
B. Unilateral Ex Ante Disclosure of Maximum Licensing Terms
C. Collectively Setting an Aggregate Royalty for a Standard
D. Global Rate-Setting Tribunals
III. Collective Licensing Models for the Internet of Things
A. Patent Pools for the IoT
i. Overcoming the Obstacles in Pool Formation
a. Assembling a Critical Number of Upstream Companies is Sufficient
b. Pool Royalty to Induce Pool Participation and Prevent Free Riding
c. Division of Royalties
d. Essentiality Checks
e. IoT Industry-Specific Licensing Terms
f. Transparency of Terms and Patents
B. Implementers’ Collective Licensing Associations
IV. Conclusion