Recent Developments in Law and Economics

Edited by Robert Cooter, Herman F. Selvin Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley, US and Francesco Parisi, Oppenheimer Wolff and Donnelly Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School, US and Professor of Economics, University of Bologna, Italy

Contents:

Volume I – Property and Intellectual Property

Acknowledgements

IntroductionRobert D. Cooter and Francesco Parisi

PART I PROPERTY LAW
1. Robert C. Ellickson (1993), ‘Property in Land’
2. Dean Lueck (1995), ‘The Rule of First Possession and the Design of the Law’
3. Michael A. Heller (1998), ‘The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets’
4. James M. Buchanan and Yong J. Yoon (2000), ‘Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons’
5. Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith (2000), ‘Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerous Clauses Principle’
6. Francesco Parisi (2002), ‘Entropy in Property’
7. Henry Hansmann and Reiner Kraakman (2000), ‘The Essential Role of Organizational Law’

PART IIINTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
8. Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg (1998), ‘Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research’
9. Hal R. Varian (2000), ‘Buying, Sharing and Renting Information Goods’
10. Josh Lerner and Jean Tirole (2002), ‘Some Simple Economics of Open Source’
11. Stephen Tadelis (1999), ‘What’s in a Name? Reputation as a Tradeable Asset’
12. Robert G. Bone (2004), ‘Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles’

Name Index


Volume II – Torts, Crimes and Remedies

Acknowledgements

An Introduction by the editor to both volumes appears in Volume I

PART I TORT LAW
1. Guido Calabresi (2007), ‘Toward a Unified Theory of Torts’
2. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell (1998), ‘Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis’
3. Richard Craswell (1999), ‘Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier Principle and its Alternatives’
4. Francesco Parisi and Vincy Fon (2004), ‘Comparative Causation’
5. Robert D. Cooter and Ariel Porat (2006), ‘Liability Externalities and Mandatory Choices: Should Doctors Pay Less?’

PART II REMEDIES
6. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Yeon-Koo Che (1991), ‘Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation’
7. Yeon-Koo Che and Tai-Yeong Chung (1999), ‘Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments’
8. Ian Ayres and Eric Talley (1995), ‘Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade’
9. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell (1996), ‘Property Rules versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis’
10. Saul Levmore (1997), ‘Unifying Remedies: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Starting Rules’
11. Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky (2002), ‘Pliability Rules’

PART III CRIMINAL LAW
12. Daniel Kessler and Steven D. Levitt (1999), ‘Using Sentence Enhancements to Distinguish Between Deterrence and Incapacitation’
13. John J. Donahue III and Steven D. Levitt (2001), ‘The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime’
14. Gary S. Becker, Kevin K. Murphy and Michael Grossman (2004), ‘The Economic Theory of Illegal Goods: The Case of Drugs’

Name Index


Volume III – Contracts and Corporations

Acknowledgements

An Introduction by the editor to both volumes appears in Volume I

PART I CONTRACT LAW
1. Oliver Hart and John Moore (1999), ‘Foundations of Incomplete Contracts’
2. Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner (1992), ‘Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules’
3. Douglas G. Baird (2006), ‘The Boilerplate Puzzle’
4. Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat (2002), ‘Anti-Insurance’
5. Robert E. Scott and George G. Triantis (2004), ‘Embedded Options and the Case Against Compensation in Contract Law’
6. Richard Craswell (2006), ‘Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in Contract Law and Elsewhere’
7. Avery Weiner Katz (1999), ‘An Economic Analysis of the Guaranty Contract’
8. Alexander J. Triantis and George G. Triantis (1998), ‘Timing Problems in Contract Breach Decisions’
9. Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar (2004), ‘Threatening an ‘Irrational’ Breach of Contract’

PART IICORPORATE LAW
10. Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1997), ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’
11. Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout (1999), ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law’
12. George G. Triantis (2000), ‘Financial Slack and the Laws of Secured Transactions’
13. Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried and David I. Walker (2002), ‘Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation’
14. Henry Hansmann and Reiner Kraakman (2001), ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’
15. Mark J. Roe (2002), ‘Corporate Law’s Limits’

Name Index