Nuclear Test Ban (eBook)

Foreword 5
Preface 7
Contents 12
To Test or Not to Testhellip 18
1.1 Testing History - More than 2000 Nuclear Explosions 19
1.1.1 China 20
1.1.2 France 21
1.1.3 India 22
1.1.4 North Korea 22
1.1.5 Pakistan 22
1.1.6 Soviet Union 23
1.1.7 United Kingdom 23
1.1.8 USA 24
1.2 Nuclear Weapons - With and Without Testing 26
1.2.1 Why Testing? 26
1.2.2 Global Nuclear Capabilities 27
1.2.3 Nuclear Weapons Without Testing 28
1.3 Why a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty? 31
1.4 Related Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament Treaties 32
Box 1 What Is a Nuclear Device? 35
Monitoring Technologies 41
2.1 Nuclear Explosions - Detectable Features 41
2.2 Detection, Location and Identification 42
2.2.1 Detection 43
2.2.1.1 Signals 43
2.2.1.2 Noise 43
2.2.1.3 Detection Processes 44
2.2.2 Event Location 46
2.2.3 Event Identification 48
2.2.4 New Developments 50
2.3 Seismological Monitoring 51
2.3.1 Seismology and Earthquakes 51
2.3.2 Seismic Waves and Wave Propagation 54
2.3.3 Seismological Stations and Networks 55
2.3.4 Seismology and Nuclear Explosions 56
2.4 Hydroacoustic Monitoring 58
2.4.1 The SOFAR Channel 58
2.4.2 Detecting the Signals 59
2.4.3 Locating Events 59
2.4.4 What do We Observe? 60
2.5 Infrasound Monitoring 60
2.5.1 What Is Infrasound? 60
2.5.2 Detecting Signals 61
2.6 Radionuclide Monitoring 63
2.6.1 Particles and Noble Gases 63
2.6.2 Particle Detection at CTBT Monitoring Stations 64
2.6.3 Detection of Noble Gases at CTBT Monitoring Stations 65
2.6.4 Tracking the Source 66
2.7 Detection from Space 66
2.8 Enabling Technologies 68
2.8.1 Computer Hardware and Software 68
2.8.2 Communications 69
2.8.3 Satellite Observations 69
2.8.4 Revolution in Information Analysis 70
Box 2 Array Stations 71
A Long Journey to a Treaty 75
3.1 Past Test Ban Initiatives 75
3.1.1 First Efforts 76
3.1.2 The Five 76
3.1.3 The Trilaterals 77
3.1.4 The Partial Test Ban Treaty 78
3.1.5 The Threshold Test Ban Treaty 79
3.2 Group of Scientific Experts 80
3.2.1 The Initial Design 81
3.2.2 The First GSE Test 82
3.2.3 The Second Test - Moving into the Digital Era 82
3.2.4 GSETT-3: Approaching a Verification System 83
3.2.5 GSE - Successful Preparatory Work 84
3.3 The CTBT Negotiations 1994-96 85
3.3.1 Starting the Negotiations 87
3.3.2 1995 - Waiting in the Hallway 88
3.3.3 1996 - The Endgame 89
3.4 Critical Issues During the Negotiations 90
3.4.1 The Preamble 90
3.4.2 The Organization 91
3.4.3 Verification 91
3.4.4 Entry into Force (EIF) 93
3.5 Reflections on the Negotiations 93
3.5.1 GSE a Tool to Get Prepared 94
3.5.2 CD a Bottleneck? 95
The Treaty 98
4.1 The Preamble 98
4.2 Basic Obligations 99
4.3 The Organization 100
4.3.1 The Conference 100
4.3.2 The Executive Council 101
4.3.3 The Technical Secretariat 102
4.4 Verification 102
4.4.1 The International Monitoring System 102
4.4.2 Consultation and Clarification 104
4.4.3 On-Site Inspections 105
4.4.4 Confidence-Building Measures 106
4.5 National Implementation Measures 106
4.6 Entry into Force 107
4.7 Reflections 108
4.7.1 Politically Significant 108
4.7.2 The Executive Council 109
4.7.3 The Role of CTBTO and States Parties 110
4.7.4 An Unprecedented Verification Regime 111
4.7.5 Verification, Too Little or Too Much? 112
The Birth of An Organization 114
5.1 The Mandate of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission 114
5.2 Preparations for the First Session of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission 116
5.3 The First Session of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission 117
5.4 The Initial Enthusiasm 121
5.5 The Early Challenges 123
Establishing the Verification Regime 127
6.1 A Complex Monitoring System in a Political Environment 127
6.2 Building the Monitoring System - A Gradual but Slow Process 141
6.2.1 Political, Cost and Capacity Factors 141
6.2.2 Technical and Administrative Aspects 143
6.2.3 IMS and IDC Status Overview 145
6.3 Some Specific IMS Issues 147
6.3.1 Station Specifications and Certification Procedures 147
6.3.2 Auxiliary Seismic Stations 148
6.3.3 Infrasound Stations 150
6.3.4 Noble Gas Stations 150
6.3.5 Cooperating National Facilities 151
6.3.6 IMS Station Coordinates 151
6.4 On-Site Inspections a Politicized Issue on a Slow Path 152
Testing Shows High Performance 157
7.1 From Building to Testing 157
7.1.5 Mode of Operation of the Global Monitoring System 157
7.2 Global Tests Show High Performance of IMS/IDC 160
7.2.1 Technology Works 160
7.2.2 Monitoring Capabilities Foreseen During the CTBT Negotiations 160
7.2.3 Current Capabilities and Projections for the Completed System 164
7.2.4 Tests of the Monitoring System Provided by Nuclear and Other Explosions 175
7.2.5 Assessment of Eventual IMS/IDC Capabilities Room for Further Improvements
7.3 Exercises Also Get OSI on the Move 183
National Technical Implementation of the CTBT 186
8.1 National Commitments 186
8.2 National Institutions Play Key Roles in the Global Verification System 187
8.3 Basis for National Interpretation 189
8.4 Regional Cooperation 191
8.5 An Assessment of the Status of National Technical Implementation 193
The CTBTO Preparatory Commission and the PTS - an Organizational Perspective 195
9.1 The Policy Making Organs 195
9.1.1 The Structure of the Policy Making Organs 195
9.1.2 The PrepCom Plenary Body 197
9.1.3 The Working Groups 198
9.1.4 Executive Secretary’s Two Faces 199
9.1.5 How did it Work Out? 200
9.2 Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) 201
9.2.1 The First Step 202
9.2.2 A ‘‘Family’’ Turning into an Organization 203
9.2.3 Evaluations Push for Better Coordination 203
9.2.4 Rules and Regulations 205
9.2.5 Staffing and the Seven-Year Service Limit 207
9.3 Changing the Guard 209
9.3.1 Reorganizing the PTS 210
The CTBTO Preparatory Commission and the World 212
10.1 States Signatories, the CTBTO Preparatory Commission and the PTS 213
10.1.1 States are the Masters of Implementation 213
10.1.2 States are Providing - and Getting - Money 214
10.1.3 States Provide the Personnel to the PTS 217
10.1.4 States are PTS Customers 221
10.1.5 States are the Hosts of Monitoring Stations and Radionuclide Laboratories 221
10.2 The CTBTO Preparatory Commission and International Organizations 222
10.2.1 Organizations in Vienna 222
10.2.2 International Humanitarian Organizations 223
10.2.3 Other International Organizations and Civil Applications 224
10.3 Synergy with Science 226
10.4 The CTBT - Hostage to Today’s Politics 231
Always Too Early to Give Up 233
11.1 Finally a CTBT - and Then? A Political Perspective 234
11.2 Most Complex Verification System Ever - a Scientific Perspective 237
11.3 Challenge to Establish a Technical Organization in a Political Environment - a Managerial Perspective 239
11.4 Bringing the CTBT Back on Track 242
11.5 A New Security Agenda 245
11.5.1 Science in Support of Security 246
11.5.2 Invest in Security 247
Annex 1 248
Primary Seismic Stations 248
Auxiliary Seismic Stations 250
Radionuclide Stations 253
Radionuclide Laboratories 257
Hydroacoustic Stations 257
Infrasound Stations 258
Annex 2 261
Chairpersons of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission 261
Executive Secretaries of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission 262
Chairpersons of Working Group A 262
Focal Points and Friends of the Chair of Working Group A 262
Chairpersons of Working Group B 263
Friends of the Chair of Working Group B 264
Program Coordinators of Working Group B 264
Task Leaders of Working Group B 264
Abbreviations and Acronyms 267
References 270
Name Index 278