Repeated Games

The late Jean-François Mertens (11 March 1946–17 July 2012) was a Belgian game theorist and mathematical economist. He earned his PhD from the Université Catholique de Louvain, where he spent his career, and was heavily involved with the university's Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). Mertens was one of the world's leaders in game theory and economic theory. He is the author and coauthor of seminal papers on equilibrium selection in games, formulation of Bayesian analysis, repeated games, stochastic games, the strategic foundations of general equilibrium theory, social choice theory, and dynamic general equilibrium. He was a founding member of the Center for Game Theory in Economics, State University of New York at Stony Brook, and remained an affiliated member until his death. He was elected a Fellow of the Econometric Society in 1981. Sylvain Sorin is a professor at the Université Pierre et Marie Curie and a member of the Institut de Mathématiques Jussieu-Paris Rive Gauche (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Unité Mixte de Recherche 7586). He was previously a professor at the Université L. Pasteur, Strasbourg, and the Université Paris X Nanterre. He was an affiliated member of the Département de Mathématiques, École Normale Supérieure, Paris; Laboratoire d'Econométrie, École Polytechnique, Palaiseau; and the Center for Game Theory in Economics, State University of New York at Stony Brook. He is a Fellow of the Econometric Society and was a charter member of the Game Theory Society. Shmuel Zamir is a professor in the department of statistics at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a founding member and Fellow of the Center for the Study of Rationality at the university. He is also Fellow of the Econometric Society, a charter member and a former council member of The Game Theory Society, and an affiliated member of the Center for Game Theory in Economics, State University of New York, Stony Brook.

1. Basic results on normal-form games; 2. Basic results on extensive-form games; 3. The beliefs space; 4. General model of repeated games; 5. Recursive games; 6. Incomplete information on two sides; 7. Stochastic games; 8. Extensions and further results; 9. Non-zero-sum games with incomplete information.