Libertarian Accounts of Free Will
Seiten
2005
Oxford University Press Inc (Verlag)
978-0-19-530642-2 (ISBN)
Oxford University Press Inc (Verlag)
978-0-19-530642-2 (ISBN)
Providing a different treatment of the various libertarian theories that do not appeal to agent causation, the author talks about his own theory of causation. He defends a type of event-causal view from popular objections concerning rationality and diminished control, exploring the extent to which event-causal accounts can secure the things.
This comprehensive study offers a balanced assessment of libertarian accounts of free will. Bringing to bear recent work on action, causation, and causal explanation, Clarke defends a type of event-causal view from popular objections concerning rationality and diminished control. He subtly explores the extent to which event-causal accounts can secure the things for the sake of which we value free will, judging their success here to be limited. Clarke then sets out a highly original agent-causal account, one that integrates agent causation and nondeterministic event causation. He defends this view from a number of objections but argues that we should find the substance causation required by any agent-causal account to be impossible. Clarke concludes that if a broad thesis of incompatibilism is correct--one on which both free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism--then no libertarian account is entirely adequate.
This comprehensive study offers a balanced assessment of libertarian accounts of free will. Bringing to bear recent work on action, causation, and causal explanation, Clarke defends a type of event-causal view from popular objections concerning rationality and diminished control. He subtly explores the extent to which event-causal accounts can secure the things for the sake of which we value free will, judging their success here to be limited. Clarke then sets out a highly original agent-causal account, one that integrates agent causation and nondeterministic event causation. He defends this view from a number of objections but argues that we should find the substance causation required by any agent-causal account to be impossible. Clarke concludes that if a broad thesis of incompatibilism is correct--one on which both free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism--then no libertarian account is entirely adequate.
Introduction ; Conclusion ; References ; Index
Erscheint lt. Verlag | 23.3.2006 |
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Verlagsort | New York |
Sprache | englisch |
Maße | 229 x 152 mm |
Gewicht | 390 g |
Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Metaphysik / Ontologie |
ISBN-10 | 0-19-530642-2 / 0195306422 |
ISBN-13 | 978-0-19-530642-2 / 9780195306422 |
Zustand | Neuware |
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