Spinoza’s Ethics of Interpretation

This book argues that the logic of Spinoza's ontological argument is supported by what the author describes as a paradox of singularity. This is because Spinoza's ontological schema posits that anything that exists must exist in such a way that its determinations follow either from what is “in-itself” or “in-another.” This establishes a paradoxical ontology in which singular things (res singulares) are singularized or differentiated through an intersection of causes each of which must be conceived either in-themselves, in-another, or – as in the paradoxical case of the human being – both at once.

The author shows that Spinoza’s ontological argument for the necessary existence of God constitutes a theory of action, way of being, or an ethos in which philosophy and religion are functionally identical. Yet, given the paradox of singularity that it involves, participation in this ethos presupposes a power of interpretation from which and for which individuals of a compatible nature strive to persevere in their being together.

The book will be of particular value to scholars who are interested in Spinoza's contributions to post-structuralism, trans-individuality, and the history of secular religious thought.