Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Volume 3

Uriah Kriegel is Professor of Philosophy at Rice University. He is the author of Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory (OUP, 2009), The Sources of Intentionality (OUP, 2011), The Varieties of Consciousness (OUP, 2015), and Brentano's Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value (OUP, 2018).

I. Mind and Science
1: Sara Aronowitz: The Parts of an Imperfect Agent
2: Henry Cowles and Joshua Knobe: The Average isn't Normal
3: Gabriel Dupre: Correspondence and Construction: The Representational Theory of Mind and Internally-Driven Classificatory Schemes
4: Gabbrielle Johnson: Bias and the Domain of Consciousness
5: Preston Lennon: Aphantasia and Conscious Thought
6: Maja Spener: The Introspective Method
II. Sensory Experience: Perception, Imagination, Pleasure
7: Dorothea Debus: Right Here, Right Now: On the Eudaimonic Value of Perceptual Awareness
8: Justin D>'Amrbosio and Daniel Stoljar: Imagination, Fiction, and Perspectival Displacement
9: Daniel Pallies and Alexander Dietz: The Dilemma for Attitude Theories of Pleasure
10: Davide Bordini: Seeing through Transparency
III. Book Symposium on David Papineau s The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience
11: David Papineau: Précis of The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience
12: Alex Byrne: Papineau on Sensory Experience
13: Angela Mendelovici: Truth and Content in Sensory Experience
14: Adam Pautz: An Argument Against Papineau s Qualitative View of Sensory Experience
15: David Papineau: Responses to Mendelovici, Pautz and Byrne
IV. History of Philosophy of Mind: Cavendish and Strong
16: David Cunning: Cavendish and Strawson on Emergence, Mind, and Self
17: Alison Peterman: 'Actions of a Body Sentient': Cavendish on the Mind (and against Panpsychism)
18: Galen Strawson: C. A. Strong: Real Materialism, Evolutionary Naturalism, Panpsychism