Perpetrator Disgust
Oxford University Press Inc (Verlag)
978-0-19-761051-0 (ISBN)
Drawing on a broad range of historical examples of perpetrator disgust and the latest philosophical and scientific research on emotions, Munch-Jurisic argues that gut feelings do not carry a straightforward and transparent intentionality in themselves, nor do they motivate any core, specific response. Instead, she suggests, they are templates that can embody a broad range of values and morals. With this core insight, she proposes a contextual understanding of emotions, by which an agent's environment shapes their available hermeneutic equipment (such as concepts, categories, and names) that an agent relies on to understand their emotions and navigate the world.
Grounded in empirical evidence and historical context, Perpetrator Disgust explores intriguing new avenues of inquiry in moral psychology and promises to be of interest to any student or scholar of philosophy, psychology, or sociology whose research considers violence, ethics, or emotions.
Ditte Marie Munch-Jurisic is a postdoctoral fellow in philosophy at Emory University and a lecturer in philosophy and minority studies at the University of Copenhagen. Her work focuses on emotions and moral psychology, combining empirical research and philosophical inquiry to reassess contemporary debates on discrimination, bias, and moral injury.
Introduction
1. Why study perpetrators?
2. The problem of perpetrator testimonies
3. The problem of conceptualizing feelings
4. Interpretive Frameworks
Chapter 1: The moral view of perpetrator disgust
1. From animal pity to self-pity
2. The wisdom of repugnance
Chapter 2: The non-moral view of perpetrator disgust
1. Disgust skeptics
2. The Limits of Empathic Distress
3. The moral deficit of empathy
4. Aesthetic Revulsion
Chapter 3: The destructive view of perpetrator disgust
1. Monstrous pity
2. Habituation interpretations of perpetrator disgust
3. The destructive view of perpetrator disgust
4. Perpetrator disgust years after the fact
Chapter 4: The moral limits of gut feelings
1. Understanding gut feelings
2. The contextual view of emotions and affect
3. Applying the contextual lens
Concluding remarks
Acknowledgements
References
Erscheinungsdatum | 12.11.2022 |
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Verlagsort | New York |
Sprache | englisch |
Maße | 210 x 148 mm |
Gewicht | 367 g |
Themenwelt | Geisteswissenschaften ► Philosophie ► Ethik |
Geisteswissenschaften ► Psychologie ► Sozialpsychologie | |
ISBN-10 | 0-19-761051-X / 019761051X |
ISBN-13 | 978-0-19-761051-0 / 9780197610510 |
Zustand | Neuware |
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